University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1967

Commercial bank failures in Montana
Donald Jerome Elliott
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Elliott, Donald Jerome, "Commercial bank failures in Montana" (1967). Graduate Student Theses,
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 4841.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/4841

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

COMMERCIAL BANK FAILURES IN MONTANA* 1920-1926

By
Donald Jerome Elliott
B.BoAo University of Washington* 1957
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1967

Approved bv

Chairman* Board of Examiners

Graduate School

MAY 2 2 1967
Date

UMI Number: EP40305

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

Dissertation Publishing

UMI EP40305
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
L I S T

O F

T A B L E S o

I N T R O D U C T I O N o

o

e

o

e

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

a

o

o

o

o

o

-

o

o

o

e

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

a

o

o

o

e

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

»

x x x

o

e

o

o

I

Chapter
I .

T H E

S E T T I N G

O F

M O N T A N A

I I „

T H E

P A T T E R N

O F

B A N K

::ill„

T H E

R O L E

G O V E R N M E N T A L

I V o

T H E

I N F L U E N C E

V o

V I o

V I I o

W O R K S

O F

O F

S T R E N G T H

S I Z E

F A C T O R

A

C O N C L U S I O N S

C I T E D

o

o

e

o

FA I L U R E S . ,

F A I L U R E S „

A S

I N

A

O

o

«

3

-

o

A U T H O R I T I E S .

A G R I C U L T U R A L

F I N A N C I A L

A S

B A N K

.

o

0

o

.

o

.

o

.

o

.

o

o

8

.

.

.

.

.

2 9

I N

B A N K

F A I L U R E S

.

.

. ‘ .

0

5 ?

F A I L U R E S

7 3

e

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

e

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

e

o

o

o

o

e

o

o

o

o

o

e

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

ii

l 8

F A C T O R S

F A C T O R

B A N K

o

8 0

0
LIST OF TABLES

ty

Table
l o

Page
Indexes of Production of Basic Commodities

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

=

6

2„

Physical Production Index for Agricultural Products in
the United States o o o o o o o o o . o o o o o o o o o 7

3o

Percent of Suspending Banks to Total Active Commercial
Banks by Type of Bank in the United States. . . . . . .19

U.

Percent of Suspending Banks to Total Active Commercial
Banks by Type of Bank in Montana. . . . . . „ . . . . .20

5.'

Percent of Deposits in Suspending Banks to Total Active
Gommerbial:. Bank Deposit^ by Typd df -Bank in .the'.Uni
ted States
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

20

6.

Percent of Deposits in Suspending Banks to Total Active
Commercial Bank Deposits by Type of Bank in Montana . .21

7.

Comparison of the Failure of Federal Reserve Member
Banks and Non-Member Banks in Montana . . o o o o . o . 2 2

8

.

9°
10.

Number and Percent of Failing and Non-Failing Banks in
Montana Classified by Capitalization, . o o . o o o o . 2 3
Number and Percent of Failing and Non-Failing Banks in
Montana Classified by Total Resources . „ . . . o . . .2li
Number and Percent of Failing and Non-Failing Banks in
Montana Classified by Deposits. . . . . . . . . . . .

.2J?

'11.

Number and Percent of Failing and Non-Failing Banks in
Montana Classified by Location. . , ,
....... . . .26

12.

Number and Percent of Failing and Non-Failing Banks in
Montana Classified by Size of Community . . . . . . . .26

13.

Number and Percent of Failing and Non-Failing Banks in
Montana Classified by Length of Life Prior to 1920. . .27

lUo

Number of People per Bank for 1909 and 1921 by State » . .32

l£.

Number of Banks to Population for Selected States in
.1920.
O'
C O O
9

16 o

.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

.

0

0

0

0

.33

Percent of Increase or Decrease in Borrowing from
Federal Reserve Banks by Member Banks . . o o o o . o . 3 9
?

iii-

Table
17.

Page
Rediscounts and Loans to Member Banks in Montana by
the Helena Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.Ul

I80

Condensed Statement of Condition for i|20 Montana Banks . .b2

19 .

Total Wheat Thrashed in Montana in Selected Years s
1899-192& . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.1*7

Changes in Population and Number of Farms in Montana«,
1880=1930 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.1*8

Average Number of Bushel Yield per Acre in Montana for
Selected Crops s 1909 and 1919 . . . . . . . . . . . .

.50

Total Farm Mortgage Debt of Owners Operating Their Own
Farms5 1910=1920. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.51*

Comparative Balance Sheet for Failing and Non-Failing
Commercial Banks in Montana in 1920 « . . . . . . . .

. ^ 8

Comparative Balance Sheet for Failing and Non-Failing
Commercial State Banks in Montana . . . . . . . . . .

.59

Comparative Balance Sheet for Failing and Non-Failing
Commercial National Banks in Montana. . . . . . . . .

.60

Changes in the Total Resources of State and National
Commercial Banks in Montana and th© United States
1918-1927 . . . * . . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.62

20.
21.
22.
23.
2k.
25.
26.

9

27.

Changes in Total Earning Assets of State and National
Commercial Banks in Montana and the United States
1918-1927 . . o o o . . . . . .. . . o . o . . . o . .63
9

28.

29.

30.

31.

Changes in the Total Deposits of State and National
Commercial Banks in Montana and the United Statess
1918-1927 .. o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.65

Changes in the Capital Account Balances of State and
National Commercial Banks in Montana and the Uni
ted States^ 1918-1927 . . . 0 . . 0 0 0 . . . . . . .

.66

Changes in the Ratio o.f Total Capital Funds to Total
Deposits for State and National Commercial Banks
in Montana and the United States,, 1918-1927 . . . . .

.67

Changes in the Ratio of Total Capital Funds to Total
Liabilities for State and National Commercial Banks
in Montana and the United States^, 1918-1927 . . . . .

.67

iv

Table

Page

32.

Changes in the Ratio of Total Loans and Discounts to
Total Deposits for State and National Commercial
Banks in Montana and the United States3 1918-1927 . » .69

33.

Changes in the Ratio of Total Deposits to Total Resources
for State and National Commercial Banks in Montana and the United States,, 1918-1927» o e . e a o o O . . . . . . 7 0

3U.

Funds Leaving Northwest States s 1920=192 lc

v

71

INTRODUCTION
f

The commercial bank failures in Montana during the 1920=-1926
period were a-tragic event in the state's history.

Many areas were

deprived of essential banking services and life-long savings disappeared
as banks closed their doors.

The human tragedy was extensive as finan

cial losses left thousands penniless to fend for themselvesj thousands
left the state.

The entire episode reflected environmental conditions

as well as basic weaknesses in the banking system.
The commercial bank failures of this period represented a com
plex problem that involved social and political as well as economic
aspects.

Such a problem can.be viewed from several vantage points.

The events present numerous possibilities for study.

Because of the

impractical nature of adequately treating these many aspects within
the present study5 the examination is restricted to several economic
aspects of the problem®

Specifically the study examines the major

causes of the commercial bank failures in Montana during the early
1920's.
The effect of environmental factors is examined as well as
basic weaknesses in the banking system.

What was the responsibility

of governmental authorities in the tragedy? Were their actions res
ponsible for the widespread failures?

These relationships are exam

ined with primary emphasis on the role of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis a Such emphasis is justified by the great importance
of the Federal Reserve System to the banking operations of this per
iod. . Another vital environmental factor was the agricultural distress
1

during this period. . Closely related to their local environments bank
operations in Montana reflected .the agricultural distress of the
early 1920*s. . These environmental factors— the actions of governmen
tal authorities and agricultural distress--were important factors in
the bank failures of this period.
Turning to an examination of the banking system* the study
scrutinizes the financial strength of Montana banks.
questions

It asks the

Was financial weakness a major factor in the Montana bank

failures of the early 1920®s?

The study reveals a basic weakness

which was a major cause of the bank failures during this period.

In

addition* the closely related problems of bank size and financial diversification are considered.
The bank failures of this period were largely the result of
these factors.

Certainlyj,, no one reason can be assigned, as responsible

for the tragic eventsj a combination of factors resulted in the wide
spread wave of bank failures that left its mark upon the future.

CHAPTER I
THE SETTING OF MONTANA BANK FAILURES
During the short period of time, between 1920 and 1926 more
9

than one-half of Montana1s commercial banks failed*-^Of the 396
state and national commercial banks in operation In 1920* 2lU had
closed their doors within 6 years

This tragic wave of bank fail

ures was closely related to the economic conditions of the period®
The econoiiQr of Montana was primarily agricultural and was
greatly affected in 1920 by the world-wide decline of agricultural
prices,,

It is as an extension of international* national and region

al economic conditions that the dramatic events in Montana are placed
in their proper perspective*

Conditions in areas outside of Montana

played a major role in the crisis of the early 1920*8 even though
peculiar local circumstances made the situation more severe than in
many other areas*
The economic displacements caused by the First World War
were the source of many of the economic problems of the early 1920*s®
National economies were highly specialized and trade patterns were a
series of delicately balanced relationships*

Generally the economic

^The term "failed" as used in this study includes % banks sus
pending operationsj banks voluntarily liquidated! banks placed in the
hands of receivers*
^Based on a tabulation of individual bank statements in the
Annual Report of the Banking Department in Montana* Nov* 1$ 1920June 30* 1926* and the AnnualReport of the Comptroller of the Cur
rency 9 Sept* 8* 1920-Dec* 31s 1926* Only banks in operation on the
beginning date are included* Failed banks are those banks that failed
duping this period®
3

a
welfare of these nations depended heavily upon trade* Not only were
these associations disrupted by the war, but the financial and fis
cal stability of many nations was seriously damaged,,

During the

First World War gold flowed out of belligerent European nations to
purchase necessary war materials and resulted in a reduction of their
monetary gold supply„ This one-way flow was a disrupting factor in
world trade relations* Neutral nations experienced the opposite ef
fect as the large inflow of gold created excess reserves and exerted
pressure on existing prices* In addition to these factors, terri
torial realignments added further confusion to the economic prob
lems of world trade
The shipment of gold bullion was not the only method used
to finance the war purchases of belligerent nations» European coun
tries liquidated large holdings of American investments! within a
few years the United States became a creditor rather than a debtor
nation,,

In addition, the United States extended large amounts of

credit to finance European purchases*
Farm prosperity in the United States during the war resul
ted from the high prices received by farmers for their products and
physical output did not increase materially until after the armis
tice,

Following the armistice, European nations tried rapidly to

rebuild their shattered economies*
sufficiency as far as possible*

Each nation sought national self-

In keeping with this policy, Euro

pean agriculture quickly regained its former productive capacity*
^The Brookings Institution, The Recovery Problem in the Uni
ted States, The Institute of Economics of the Brookings Institution
publication no* 72 (Washington, D. C*, 1936),
Cited hereafter
as Brookings Institution, Recovery Problem*

Ely 1925 s tiie agricultural production, of Europe reached its pre-war
level.^

This recovery had a great impact on agricultural conditions

in the United States since the war-time prosperity of farmers was
largely the result of the increased European demand.

As European

agricultural production increased and as the credits extended by the
United States decreased, a price decline began that affected agri
cultural products around the world.
In the spring and summer of 1920, a world-wide price de
cline took place.

Hie avalanche of descending prices engulfed most

industries and individuals.

It began with the collapse of the silk

market in Japan and spread in wide circles around the globe.

The

countries of the Far East-, India, Java, Australia, Europe and North
and South America all were generally affected; in the same way and
at the same time.*’ This economic collapse ended the brief period
of rapid expansion in the United States that followed the war.
The economy of the United States expanded rapidly during
the years of the First World War.

Between 1915 and 1920 the level

of national income more than doubled.

Farm income in 1919 was

more than double the average annual amount for the five year per
iod preceding the war. . This increase in farm income was primarily
the result of a 100 percent increase in the prices received by
^Brookings Institution, Recovery Problem, 13-Hu
5u„ S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, Hearing before the
Joint Commission of Agriculturallnquiry, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(Washington, 192^), II, 13. Cited hereafter as U. S. Congress,
Agricultural Inquiry9 II«

farmers for their products and only to a small extent by the 7 per
cent increase in agricultural production®^
During the years immediately following the war5 agricultural
and industrial production generally increased,,
the early 1920

production was uneven®

During the years of

The world-wide price de

clines in 1920 were reflected in the production indexes of most basic
commoditieso

Table 1 gives an index of production in several basic

industries during this period®

Table 2 illustrates the changes in

agricultural production®

T A B L E

1

INDEXES OF PRODUCTION OF BASIC COMMODITIES3,
Item
General Index
Pig Iron
Steel Ingots
Cotton Textiles
WooJ Textiles
Hheat Flour
Animals Slaught
ered §
Cattle
Calves
Sheep
Hogs
Lumber
Copper

1919

.1920

1921

1922

1923

192U

1925

100
100
100
100
100
100

105
119
121
98
89
8h

80
55
57
92
98
92

98
88
102
103
98
95

120
131
129
110
110
96

108
102
109
93
95
101

116
119
131
108
9k
95

100
100
100
100
100
100

86
103
86
91
101
105

76
97
103
95
75
39

86
106
87
106
102
82

91
11 a
92
131
I h
122

95
126
95
127
118
131

98
137
96
10a
12a
139

2

aSource s National Industrial Conference Boards Inc ® s B
trial-Economic Conditions in the United States,,. Bulletin No® 17
(New York, 1927)s 9®

Paul ¥® McCracken,, The Northwest in Two Warsa Federal Re
serve Bank of Minneapolis (Minneapolis5 n 0d„)<> 2-3® Cited here
after as McCracken9 Northwest in Two Wars®

7
TABLE 2
PHYSICAL PRODUCTION INDEX FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1929-I00)a
Year

Index

1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1921*
1925

86.1
9 0 .1

82.1
91.0
9U.0
96 cO
9 6 .0
1 0 1 .0

1926

aSources The Brookings Institution, The Recovery Problem
in the United States 9 The Institute of Economics of the Brookings
Institution publication no. 72 (Washington, D. C., 1936 ), 628.
Immediately following the end of the First World War, the
accumulated demand for goods led to a period of intense spending
and business prosperity in the United States.

It was a period

characterized by an "unprecedented orgy of extravagance, a mania
for speculation, over-extended business in nearly all lines and in
every section of the country, and general demoralization of the agen
cies of production and distribution."^

A Congressional investigat

ing commission in 1921 described these years as "a period of expan
sion, extravagance, and speculation, the like of which has never
O
before been seen in this country or perhaps in the world."
In
1920 a precipitous decline in prices took place.

In the United-

States the decline involved, every class of industry and people.^
7

'Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual
Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
December 319 19210 1. Cited hereafter as Annual Report of the Fed
eral Reserve Board, 1921.
8U. S. Congress,. Agricultural Inquiry, II, 12-13.
S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 13.

8
The tide of optimism and expansion quickly turned to one of defla
tion and depression*.

Agricultural prices declined sharply as Euro

pean export demand declined.
The year 1922 in the United States was a period of continu
ous economic recovery from the 1920 price decline.

The latter half

of 1921 was a period of relative price stability and this factor
encouraged the expansion of business operations.

In addition,

agricultural conditions Improved although agricultural prices
remained out of line with those of industry.^
In the spring of 1923 a slight recession took place in
business activity and continued until the middle of the following
year.

In agricultural areas, farm income was as large as it was

in 1923 and the result was an improvement in the relative position
of the farmer.

This readjustment between the levels of industrial

and farm prices was an important factor in the restoration of busi
ness prosperity later in the year."5"*- Throughout the 192^-1926 per
iod, economic conditions continued to improve..

In 1926, industrial

output exceeded previous levels and wage payments and employment
were high.

Generally, agriculture enjoyed large crop yields.

12

Banking operations during the period following the turn
of the century were closely related to economic conditions.

Rising

prices in the two decades following 1900 allowed profitable banking
operations in spite of many slipshod p r a c t i c e s T h e widespread
-^Annual Report of the Federal Reserve. Board, 1922,
^-Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 192b
Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1926,
^Ibid.0 13 0

9
prosperity and rising prices that occurred during the First World
War were regarded as a normal situation.^
|During the war the banking system facilitated the mobili- ■
zation of the industrial and financial resources of the nation
through its credit expansion. .Bank credit made possible the pur.chase of large quantities of government bonds as well as the capi
tal necessary for the productive expansion of industry.

During

this period the Federal Reserve System regulated its policy to
meet the needs of the Treasury Department.- The success of the
Victory Loan in May* 1919* depended upon a continuation of this
easy credit policy.

It was not tintil the rapid expansion was well

under way that the Federal Reserve System adopted policies to
tighten the availability of credit.

The result of the easy credit

policy was the extension by commercial banks of large amounts of
credit based on the inflated commodity and land values of the per
iod.

Funds were loaned for land speculation and industrial expan-

sion and excess credit lines became common.
sion was sharply curtailed.

1^

In 1920 this expan

As prices and values declined banks

were unable to liquidate loans to meet heavy deposit withdrawals
and other financial strains. .The results were disastrous. j
These conditions were particularly true in Montana where
rapid growth had pushed land values to new high levels.

The popu

lation of Montana had expanded rapidly after the turn of the century.

■^C. D. Bremer* American Bank Failures (New York* 1935) * 33.
Cited hereafter as Bremer* Bank Failures.
'
l5
-'American Bankers Association^ Present Day Banking (New
Yorks 1936)£ 218. Cited hereafter as Bankers Association* Present
Day Banking.

/■
10
Between 1900 and 1920* the population more than doubled.

This rapid

increase of settlers was encouraged by the liberal provisions of
the Homestead Acts of 1909 and 1912.

Land grant size was increased

from 160 to 320 acres and the proving-up time was decreased from 5
to 3 years.

Under these conditions a 320 acre plot of land could
■j /L

be settled for less than 50 dollars.
With the rapid increase in population came an increase in
land values.

Land that was valued at $250 million in 1910* by 1918 .

17
was worth twice that amount. ' Wheat prices soared and optimistic
farmers and bankers expected it to go even higher.

Farmers borrow-

ed to expand their operations at the inflated land values and bank
ers prospered as values continued to increase.
Such dohditiohs: .could not continue indefinitely.
a period of drought overtook Montana.

In 1919*

In 1920* severe winds swept

away the'plowed top soil and added to the agricultural misery.
The drought continued into 1921 as falling farm prices aggravated
an already severe situation.

Farmers.tried to withhold their pro

ducts from the market but were eventually forced to sell at rapid
ly declining pricesMortgage foreclosures increased rapidly and
between 1919 and 1925 the number reached 20*000 in the stated

This

tragic number represents the bulk of the farm foreclosures in the
history of the state.
^Clarence W. Groth* "Montana Banking History*11(unpublished
thesis* School of Banking* Rutgers University)* 1*0. Cited hereafter
as Groth* "Montana Banking History.*'
235o

17k. R o s s Toole* Montanas An Uncommon Land (Norman* 1959)*
Cited hereafter as Toole* Uncommon Land.
l8Ibid.q 238.

II
/Montana banks generally were small institutions serving a
small local area.

Assets were largely confined to local loans and

lacked the diversification necessary for financial strength.

With

the severe strain of the early 1920's, a majority of these banks
(5U percent) were unable to continue operations.

The widespread

bank failures!*that took place added to Montana's grave economic
distress.^
The Superintendent of Banks in Montana described the his
tory of the period as a reading of "Jeremiah's Book of Lamenta
tions" and an "Egyptian famine."

The 1920-192U period was "one

long dripping tunnel— a veritable nightmare" in which each new day
brought new disasters.

Of the 277 state banks reporting in 1921

to his office, 85 held less than the required legal reserve and
181 had not been examined by the Banking Department within the
period required by law.

The examinations that were conducted re

vealed banks full of "second mortgages, frozen assets, land con
tracts, commission notes and whatnot."^

It is with this under

standing of the economic background of the period that attention
is turned to another important aspect of the setting for Montana
bank failures— the legal framework within which banks operated dur
ing this period.
Since the founding of the American colonies, government
has pursued an active and continually expanding role in the regu
lation of economic life.

Within the complex economic organization

Annual Report of.the Banking Department, State of Mont
ana for the fiscal year ending June 309 192k* 12. Cited hereafter
as Annual Report of the Banking Department, 1921;.

12
that evolved the banking system occupied a central position? banks
became a fundamental factor in economic growth and prosperity*,

Be

cause of its quasi-public position* banking required governmental
supervision which* by 1920* was a

complex and sophisticated regula

tory system*

f.
«

Divided government control further complicated the system
of bank regulation*

The nation's banks were subject to regulation

by forty-eight state governments as well as the Federal government.
Within this complex system of regulation* jurisdictional problems
often developed.

Banks were frequently subject to the regulation

of several governmental agencies.

Often* as in

a striking similarity between Federal and

state

Montana* therewas
requirements.How

ever* Federal supervision generally entailed more restrictive re
quirements than the state banking codes.
The Federal government took several early steps toward
strengthening.the banking system. .In I86I4 a step was taken toward
uniform direction and control of bahking by the Federal government
when the Banking Act was passed.

This act provided the legal

framework of a national banking system.

Primary responsibility

for the supervision of the national banks to be chartered under
this act was given to the Bureau of the Comptroller of the Cur
rency.

Restrictions were imposed on the organization* note issue

and required reserves of national banks.
in these laws in the following years.

Several changes were made

A major revision of the laws

regulating national banks took place in 1913 with the passage of
the Federal Reserve Act.

:i"3
.By 1920, Federal regulation of national banks had developed
into a complex legal framework.

Organization and liquidation was

under the direction of the Comptroller of the Currency.

Capital

requirements were set at $200,000 for banks located in cities with
more than 50,000 inhabitantsj $100,000 for cities between 6,000 and
50,000j $50,000 for cities from 3,000 to 6,000j $25*000 for cities
of less than 3,000 inhabitants.

Reserve requirements for demand

deposits were set at 13 percent for central reserve city banks,
10 percent for reserve city banks, and 7 percent for other national
banks. ,Time deposits required a reserve of

3

percent.

These re

serves were to be deposited with the Federal Reserve bank and cash
on hand could not be included as a part of the required reserve.
Stockholders were:-liable for the debts of the bank to the extent
of the par value of their shares in addition to the amount invested in them, I
f In addition, numerous limitations were placed on
other aspects of the banks operations.

Loans to any individual,

partnership or corporation were limited in amount to 10 percent of
the paid-in capital and surplus.

Loans could not be made using

the bank's shares as collateral.

The Comptroller of the Currency

conducted at least two examinations annually of each bank.

A

minimum of five financial reports were required each year.

In

addition, special reports could be requested whenever it was deemed
necessary.
The scope of national bank operations was expanded corisiderably by the Federal Reserve Act.

Former restrictions had placed

national banks at a competitive disadvantage with state banks.

lU
Many of these restrictions were removed by the Federal Reserve Act.
National banks were granted fiduciary powers in areas where state
banks enjoyed this privilege.

The reduction of reserve requirements

and the privilege of extending real estate loans opened the profit
able savings business to national banks.
unencumbered, improved farm land.

Loans were permitted on

These loans could' not exceed

50 percent of.the market value of the property and were limited to

a maximum period of five years. The total amount of such loans
could not exceed 25 percent of the lending bank's capital and surplus or one-third of its time deposits.

Loans on improved urban

property were permitted for a maximum maturity of one year.

These

restrictions were only a few of the many regulations applied to
pa

national bank, operations. ^
Another important governmental agency was created by the
Federal Reserve Act.| The Federal Reserve System was established to
provide the nation with an elastic currency, discounting facilities
f

and improved banking supervision.

Membership was required for all

national banks while participation was optional for state banks.
Important changes were made to the original bill in the following
years. After the crisis of 1920, farm groups were successful in
'•
‘ I
1
‘
.
,
obtaining several changes in :the law. An amendment in 1922 pro
vided for a representative of agriculture on the Federal Reserve
Board.

Concessions were made in 1923 when the capital requirements

for membership of state banks were lowered by 60 percent.

In

Statutes at Large, XXXVIII-XLI, Title 12 passim.
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addition, Federal Reserve banks were allowed to discount or purchase
certain agricultural sight drafts3 acceptances, and agricultural
papero 21
Membership in the Federal Reserve ^ stem.involved certain
obligations. .Generally these requirements were similar to those
prescribed for national banks.

In addition to meeting these re

quirements, member banks enjoyed the use of the loan and rediscounting as well we the check collecting facilities of the Federal Re
serve System.
By 1920, the number of state banks considerably exceeded
the number of national banks.
supervision of state officials.

These banks were subject fcto the
In Montana the first banking laws

were enacted in 1887, prior to statehood.

During the following

years these banking laws were improved and expanded.
extensive revisions were made to the banking code.

In 19155
It was gener

ally within this legal framework of 1915 that the state banks of
Montana operated during.the 1920-1926 period.
The Banking Department was established to exercise govern
mental supervision over state banks and was placed under the direc
tion of the Superintendent of Banks.

The State Examiner became

ex-officio Superintendent of Banks and was appointed to a four
year term by the governor.

The Superintendent was primarily con

cerned with the financial condition of state banks and to insure
observation of state banking laws.

In order to determine the

^^Fredrick A. Bradfords Banking (Mew York9 1932)s 75-121*
passim. Cited hereafter as Bradford, Banking.
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financial condition of state ba nksthe Superintendent required five
regular financial reports each year.

In addition to these5 special

reports could be requested when deemed necessary. 'At least two
bank examinations were required each year to provide a verification
of the bank’s financial condition.

In these audits, examiners con

cerned themselves with the bank’s observation of sound banking
principles as well as their compliance with legal requirements.
1 By 1920, state banks were subject tb a considerable number
1
of state requirements. Operations could begin and end only with
the approval of the Banking Department.
set for bank capital.

A minimum of $20s000 was

Stockholders were liable for bank debts to

the extent of the par value of their shares in addition to the
amount invested in them. | Real estate loans were generally restric
ted'to first liens and a maximum loan amount was set at 50 percent
of the property’s market value.

A maximum of 35 percent of the

bank’s assets'could be in this form.

Loand to any individuals

partnership or corporation could not exceed 20 percent of the capi
tal and surplus of the bank.

Reserve requirements were set at

10 percent of deposits, a portion of which could be deposited with
reserve banks approved by the Superintendent.

Reserve banks were

required to maintain a 15 percent reserve in a similar manner.

These

requirements , in many respects, were similar to those for national
banks. ^
Other governmental authorities., to a lesser extent, influ
enced the operation of the bahking system.

By 1920 these governmental

^^Montana5 Revised Statutes (1921)s c. 13, secs. 601ii=6l09®
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relationships had become an important characteristic of the banking
system*

It is in this light that these relationships become an im

portant part of the bank failure pattern of the early 1920's.
Economic conditions and governmental regulations were im
portant factors in the setting of Montana bank failures.

It.-is

with this understanding that the following chapter turns to a de
tailed examination of the bank failure pattern*

CHAPTER II
THE PATTERN OF BANK FAILURES
The widespread wave of bank failures during the early 1920's
revealed several basic weaknesses in the banking system.

The eco

nomic- readjustment that followed the end of World War I brought a
sharp decline in the prices of agricultural products.
a rapidly decreasing

Farmers faced

income while the price of needed supplies con-

tinned to increase. | Faced with high fixed mortgage payments and
rising costs, the farmers turned to local banks for credit.

Small,

unit banks in rural agricultural areas were soon overburdened with
past due and uncollectable loans.

A widespread wave of bank fail

ures reflected this financial distress.

A large percentage of the

nation's banks failedj others continued operations throughout the
1920-1926 period.

In several important respects, common charac

teristics can be•distinguished between these failing and non-failing
banks.

Such a failure pattern becomes an important consideration

in understanding the bank failures of this period."*' |
An important aspect of bank operations was the supervising
authority of governmental agencies.

A noted difference existed

between the failure of nationally and state chartered banks.

For

the United States"as a whole, state banks failed twice as often as
national banks.

The average yearly suspension of total active

^The classification of failing banks, except in Tables 1U, includes state banks that suspended operations between Nov. 1$9
1920, and June 30, 1926. National banks are included as failing
that closed between Sept. 8, 1920 and Dec. 31, 1926, and did not
reopen.
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commercial banks for the 1921=1925 period was 1.06 percent for
national banks and 2.17 percent for state banks.

Although these

differences varied from year to year5 the percentage of state bank
failures was higher than those for national banks throughout the
period.

Table 3 illustrates this yearly difference.
TABLE 3
PERCENT OF SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL ACTIVE
COMMERCIAL BANKS BY TYPE OF BANK
IN THE UNITED STATES a

Year

National

1921
1922
1923
192h
1925

,6h%
.59
lo09
1.50
1 1*6

.

State
1.83$
1.3U
2.U?
2.95
2.26

Ratio State
to Nat?l
2.86
2.27
2 .2 6

1.97
1.55

aCalculated from2 All-Bank Statistics! United States
1896=19553 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Wash=
ington^ D. C.s 1959)«>.!il? U5S and Banking and Monetary Statistics9
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington^ D. G.3
19U3)9 283.
In. Montana there were important differences from these na=
tional averages.

A higher percentage of both national and state

banks failed in Montana than the average for the United States.
The average yearly suspension of active Montana commercial banks
was 10.1 percent for national banks and 12.2 percent for state
banks.

The average yearly suspensions for this 5 year period in

Montana exceeded the United States average by 9.5 times for national
banks and 5.6 times for state banks.

However5 the ratio between

state and national bank failures in Montana was much less than for
the nation as a whole.
following table.

These yearly differences are shown in the
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TABLE k
PERCENT OF SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL ACTIVE
COMMERCIAL BANKS BY TYPE OF BANK
IN MONTANA a
Year

National

State

1921
1922

tio9%

5o h%

1923
192U
1925

6 .8

llwO
H 4..0

8 .2
2l*.8
1 8 .1

1 0 .6

k.7

Ratio State
to Nat8l
1 .1 0
1 .2 1

1.77
1.29
.UU

aGalculated froms All-Bank Statistics1 United States
1896 -195^9 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemTWashingtoixj, Di Co9 19$9)s 609 ^ 613 ^ and Banking and Monetary Statistics9
Board of Governors ©f the Federal Reserve System (Washingtons Do C . 5
19U3)s.9 0 , 188 s 286.
The comparison of national and state bank failures is even
more striking when bank deposits are examined.

Deposits of sus

pending state banks averaged 2 .8 ? times higher than for suspending
national banks for the 5 year period.

The yearly percentages in the

following table show this variation.
TABLE 5

Year

PERCENT OF DEPOSITS IN SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL
ACTIVE COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS BY TYPE OF
BANK IN THE UNITED STATES a
Ratio State
.tb'.'-Natilt.
National
State

1921-

olh%

1922

.12
.2 0

.78$
.36
.53

.35

.6 0
.111

1923
192L
1925

.28

5.57
3 .0 0

2.65
1.71
1 .U6

aCalculated froms All-Bank Statisticsj United States 1896 1955.9 Board ,of Governors ©f the Federal Reserve System (Washington*
D. C.a 1959), UU* and Banking and Monetary Statistics,, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, D. C.s 19U3)<>
20 =2 1 ,, 283.

21
In Montana the percentage of suspended deposits to total
deposits was much higher than the nation-wide average.

National

and state banks in the United States averaged deposit suspensions
of .22 percent and .58 percent of their deposits respectively for
the 1921-1921? period.

In Montana national bank deposit suspensions

averaged lj,08 percent while those for state banks averaged 8.3 percent
during this period.

The ratio of state bank deposit suspensions to
t

national bank suspensions was much less than the nation-wide average.
In Montana state bank deposit suspensions averaged 1.77 times those
of national banks during the 1921-1925 period.

This stands in

sharp contrast to the nation-wide average for state bank deposit
suspensions of 2.88 times those of. national banks.

Table 6 illus

trates the yearly percentages for Montana.
TABLE 6

Year
1921
1922
1923
192k
1925

PERCENT OF DEPOSITS IN SUSPENDING BANKS TO TOTAL
ACTIVE COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS BY TYPE
OF BANK IN MONTANA a
Ratio State
National
State
to Nat'l
.1.9$
it.l
8.9
6.8
2.1

6„k%
5.6
18.6
9.3
lok

3.37
1.37
2.09
1.37
.66

Calculated froms All-Bank Statistics g United States 1896 °
1955.0 Board of Governors of”the Federal Reserve System (Washington*
Di C.a 1959)a 6082 612a and Banking and Monetary Statistics9 Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Washington s D. C.a 1953)<>
28 y3 2893 291 .
The Federal Reserve System prescribed certain requirements
for national and state memberr banks.

One of the objectives of the

22
System was to bring financial stability to the banking system as a
whole.

In the United States during the early 1920's <, non-member

banks generally failed twice as often as Federal Reserve member
banks.

2

'

-

'

This difference was less distinct in Montana.

An examina

tion of Montana banks in 1920 shows that 5>X percent of member and
Si percent .of non-member banks file’d by the end of the period.

These

differences are illustrated by the following table.
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBER
BANKS AND NON-MEMBER- BANKS IN MONTANA a
Member
Number
Percent

Banks
Failing
Nan-Failing
Total

Non-Member
Number
Percent

100
96

$±%
h9

111*.
86

2+3

196

100

200

100

a
-.Calculated froms statements contained in the.Annual Reports
of the Montana Banking Department between Nov. ±Ss 19205 and June 3Qa
1926a and from.statements in .the Annual Reports of the Comptroller
of the Currency between Sept..8 ,, 1920,, and Dec. 31 <, 1926. Membership
is based on membership of state banks on Nov. ±Ss ±920s and of nation
al banks on Sept. 8 5 1920.
Bank size was another important part of the failure patterne
Failing banks generally were smaller institutions than non-failing
banks. |The average capitalizations of failing national and state
banks in Montana were $Ii73770 and $359928 respectively.

These av

erages for non=failing banks were $685676 and §\xlsb$& respectively.
2
See statistics in Banking and Monetary Statistics9 Board
of Governors of the Federal"Reserve System (Washingtons D. C . 5
19k3)s>.21 -225 283 .
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Numerous exceptions existed to this general rule.
banks as well as small banks failed.

Individual large

However^ larger banks were

able to withstand the financial pressures of the early 1920>s better
than the smaller^ less diversified banks.

The following table clas-

sifies Montana commercial banks by the amount of capitalization.
tabu;8

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING BANKS
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY CAPITALIZATION a
Failing
Percent
Number

Capital
-$ 2 0 s000
:.205001“ 305000
30s001- 50s000

63
95
31
15
8
2

5osooi-loo5ooo

100 ,,001-200,,000
2005001-500s000

Total

29*$%
Uk.k
Uio5
7®0
3o7
.9
100.0

-2U

Non-Failing
Percent
Number
35
72
33
2U
12
6

19 o2%
39*6
18.1
13<>2
6.6
3»3

182

100.0-

aCalculated froms statements contained in the Annual Reports
of the Montana Banking Department between Nov.. l5<> 1920,, and June 30s
1926 s and from statements in the Annual Reports o:f the Comptroller
of the Currency between Sept. 85 1920s and Dec. 315 1926. Capitalization amount for national banks, is as of Sept® 85 19205 and for
state banks as of Nov. l$s 1920.
Capitalization is only one method of indicating.the size.of
a bank.

When considered as an isolated factor in determining bank

size it may be misleading.

In addition to capitalization,, other

factors should be considered.

Another means of comparing the rela

tive size of banks is by comparing total resources.

The averages

of total resources for failing national and state banks in Montana
were $319sl|ll and $5625527 respectively.

These averages for non

failing national and state banks were $1|95<>813 and $982s78?

2U
respectively*

These averages and the classification of banks by total

resources in Table 9 .show that banks with &mall.<-resources failed more
often than banks with larger total resources*
TABLE 9
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON“FAILING BANKS
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY TOTAL RESOURCES a
Total Resources
- $100*000
100*001=2^0*000
250 *001 =
500*000
50 0 *001 - 1*000*000
1*000*001= 2*500*000
2*500*001= 5*000*000
5 *000 *001 =
Total

Failing
timber Percent
23
96
59
17
13
6
0 0

21k

10.7$
kk.9
27.6
7.9
6.1
2.8
0 0 0

100.0

Non-Failing
Percent
Number
12
73
Uo
31
13
11
2
182

6.6%
hOol
22.0
17.0
7.1
6.1
1.1
100.0

a

Calculated froms statements contained in the
of the Montana Banking Department between Nov*. l5fl 1920* and June 3Q*
1926* and from statements in the'Annual Reports of the 'Comptroller' of
the Currency between Sept* 8* 1920* and Dec-. 3-ip 1926. Total resources
for national banks are as of Sept; 8* 1920* and for state banks as of
Nov. 15* 1920.
■Another useful measure of bank size is the amount of total time
and demand deposits. .The average total deposits in failing Montana
national and1state banks were $355s9k9 and $20^*965 respectively. These
averages for non-failing national and state banks for the 5 year per
iod were $691*555 and $369*138 respectively®

Failing banks generally

were smaller than non-failing banks whether measured by capitalization*
total resources* or deposits.

A comparison of failing and non-failing

bank deposits in Montana is contained in the following table.
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TABLE 10
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON“FAILING
BANKS IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY DEPOSITSa
Failing
[umber Percent

Deposits*3
75*oo i -

$753000
i 5o ,ooo

15 0 .001 - 350^000
350 ,001 “ 60 0,0 00
6 0 0 .001 -1 ,00 0,0 00
1 ,000 ,001 -2 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 ,5 0 0 ,001 -5 *0 0 0,0 00

5 ,000,001-

50
58
72
13'
12
8
1
0 ©

Total

211*

23.1$
27.1
33.6
6.1
5.6
3.7
.5
0 0 0

1 0 0 .0

Non-Failing
Number
Percent
18
56
55

9o9%
30.8
3 0 .2

8
15
5
2

12.6
u.u
8.2
2.8
1.1

182

100.0
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el
.Calculated froms statements contained in the Annual Re
ports of the Montana Banking Department between Not, 15, 1920, and
June '30, 1926, and^from statements in the Annual Reports of the
Comptroller of the Currency between Sept. 8V1920, and Dec. 31«
19260

Includes time and demand deposits on Nov. 15, 1920, for
state banks and on Sept, 8, 1920, for national banks.
Since a bank primarily serves its local area, the location of
failing and non-failing banks is an important part of the failure-pat
tern,

Failures west of the Continental Divide in Montana were a

smaller percentage of the area's active commercial banks than, in the
remainder of the state,, This East-West distribution of failures is
illustrated by Table 11,
Generally,, failing banks were located in smaller communities
than non-failing banks.

This factor and the East-West distribution of

bank failures suggests the rural, agricultural influence upon the
failure pattern.

Nearly 58 percent of the bank failures in Montana

occurred in communities of less than 500 population.

For the United
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States as a whole, 3lu9 percent of failures were in communities with
less than 500 population.

Failures in Montana communities of less than

2.,000 persons included 85 percent of the state’s bank failures.

Table

12 illustrates the failure? pattsbnrhyp the-::©ize of the community.
TABLE 11

Banks

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING BANKS
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY LOCATION3,
b
East
West
Numberv Percent
Number ■Percent

Failing
Non-Failing
Total

19k
150
31*1*

56. h%
U3.o
100.0

20
32
52

38.5#
61.5
100.0

aCalculated from the location of failing banks indicated in state
ments in the Annual Reports of the Montana Banking Department between
Nov. 15, 19207 and~June 20/ 19269 and from.statements in the Annual Reports
of the Comptroller of the Currency between Sept. 8, 1920, and Dec. 31, 1926.
/^Includes areas west of the Continental Divide in Montana.
TABLE 12
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING BANKS
IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY3,
Failing
Non-Failing
•U
Community Population
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
1*2.0
300
50
90
27.5
301500
13.7
3h
15.9
25
501- 1,000
19.2
31
35
H i.5
1,001-;
000
12 .6
H i.8
27
27
2 ,0 0 1 - 3,000
11
8
5 .1
li.U
3s001= 5,000
••
5 .0
09 0
9
5 , 001=10,000
12
5 .6
5 .0
9
10,001=20,000
12
6 .6
1 .9
i*
2 0 ,00 12.1*
3 .8
5
7
Total
182
100.0
21I*
100.0
aCalculated from the location of failing banks indicated by state
ments in the Annual Report of the Banking Department in Montana between
Nov. 15, 1920, and June 30, 1926, and from Statements in the Annual Report
of the Comptroller of the Currency between Sept. 8, 1920, and Dec. 31, 1926.
"L

Based on population in 1920.

3
Bremer, Bank Failures, 1*8.
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A useful comparison of failing and non-failing banks is one that
examines the length of bank life prior to failureo

This comparison

shows the extent that banks had become an accepted and long-standing
part of the community.

In Table 13 banks are arranged into categories

by the date of their incorporation.

Of the failing banks3 79 percent

were incorporated after 1910j 68 percent of the non-failing banks were
incorporated during the same period.

From this eorrparison it is evident

that failing banks were not as well established and were newer ins titutions than non-failing banks.

'
TABLE 13

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF FAILING AND NON-FAILING
BANKS IN MONTANA CLASSIFIED BY LENGTH
OF LIFE PRIOR TO 1920a
Incorporation Date
1918
1915
1910
1905
1900

Failing
Number Percent

-1920
- 1917
- 1911*
- 1909
- 190U
- 1899
Total

31
6?
73
30
7
6
21k

Non-Failing
■Number
Percent
lh
55
$k
28
13

1 5

30
3k
Ik
U
3
100

18

182

8
30
30
1 5

7
9
100

aSource % Calculated from; Statements contained in the Annual
Report of the Banking Department between Nov. X55 1920«, and June 30 .>
19262 and from statements in the Annual Report of the Comptroller of
the Currency between Sept. 85,1920s and Dee. 31, 19267
The bank failures in Montana during the 1920-1926 period were
primarily a rurals small bank phenomena.

Closely tied to the local

economy <> small rural banks often were unable to withstand the crisis
created by sharply declining agricultural prices.

The widespread wave

of bank failures demonstrated the basic weaknesses of the nation's
small unit banking system. . Among these weaknesses several major
\
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problems are apparent,,

These aspects of the banking system— regula

tory authority, agricultural factors,, financial strength, and bank
size— merit further examination in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III
THE HOLE OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES
The legal framework of banking laws and regulations was an
important part of the bank failure pattern of the early 1920"s.
State banks generally failed more often than national banks in the
United States.

This variation can be partially explained by the

higher standards required for national bank charters.

The result

of this stricter policy was that national banks generally were
stronger and more diversified institutions than most state banks.
In Montana the difference between state and national bank regula
tions was less than in many states.

As a result,, the difference was

not as great between the individual banks and their failure rates.
Comparisons between Federal Reserve member and non-member state
banks reflect this same relationship.
|jGenerallys the influence of governmental policy upon the
operations of individual banks was indirect and should not be over
emphasized.

Government regulation and supervision could not insure,,

in itself* a sound banking policy.

It could only assist in attain

ing that end."*" General responsibility for the operation of a bank
rests with its management.

Since the test of effective management

"*"R. F. Leonard,, "Supervision of the Commercial Banking System.,,"
Banking Studies„ Board nf Governors of the Federal Reserve System
^Baltimore,, ±9l\l)3 192.
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2
is the ability to resolve unforeseen difficulties, the responsibility
for a bank's failure rests with its management and generally cannot be
shifted to others.,, \
What, then3 was the relationship of government actions during
the 1920-1926 period, to the widespread wave of bank failures?

In

answering this question, primary concern is directed toward those
agencies that directly supervised the operations of commercial banks—
the state Banking Department in. Montana, the Comptroller of the Cur
rency, and the Federal Reserve System.
The banking system, as a whole, has suffered from the division
of governmental supervision.

The existence of different systems of

governmental supervision has encouraged competition between govern
mental agencies to extend their influence and jurisdiction.

This

competition was responsible for many of the problems that faced banks
during the early 1920’s.

The unit banking system that developed in

the United States was a natural outgrowth of this divided jurisdiction.
States-rights became an effective barrier against a more uniform sys3
tern.
The result was a competitive lowering of banking restrictions
and a situation that made reform difficult .A

The ability of indivi

dual banks to shift from one system to the other made authorities re
luctant to strengthen banking requirements or to strictly enforce their
provisions.
p
Bremer, Bank Failures, 99«
3

Ibid.9 9$„
^Thomas Joel Anderson, Federal and State Control of Banking
(New York, 193k)9 3,
30k• Cited hereafter as Anderson,. Control of
Banking.
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Governmental competition was reflected in the chartering of
banks« Charters often were granted to banks that would compete with
those operating under another governmental authority where the need
for such additional services did not exist.
an excessive number of banks.

The inevitable result was

By 1921 the number of banks in the Uni-

ted States reached an all-time high of nearly 23<,000 state and 8^000
5
-national banks.

Bitter competition developed between banks for the

available business.

This excessive chartering of banks was a funda

mental cause of the bank failures in the early 1920 ss.^

States where

the number of banks to population was hig.ha without exceptions suf7
fered high bank failure rates.
This relationship is illustrated by
the experience of New Jersey where a strict charter policy prevailed
8
and where bank failure were negligible.
■

The bank failure pattern in the Ninth Federal Reserve Dis
trict reflected this overbanked condition.

Credit competition often

resulted in questionable loans made by banks— "loans which often
O
broke the banks and debtors alike."
Tables 11+ and 1£ illustrate
that Montana was no exception to this general pattern.

Between

1910 and 1920 there were 397 bank charters granted in Montana.

In

^Bankers Association Present Day Banking., 196-97*
6
Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency for the Year
Ending December 31~i 1925 „ 5° Cited hereafter as Annual Report of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 1925°
7
Bahkers Association,, Present Day Banking,, 2l£.
O
Virgil Willits Chain, Group and Branch Banking (New Yorks
1930. 126. Cited hereafter as Willit. Banking.
^McCracken* Northwest in Two Wars, 17«
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1917 a high, point was reached when 82 charters were a p p r o v e d B e 
tween 1911 and 1920 the total number of banks increased from 175 to
U31 in Montanao

By 1930 this total had declined to its 1911 level.

11

The fact that many of the charters issued were never used indicates
a careless charter policy.

Obtaining a charter often became a specu

lative undertaking in anticipation of a profitable opportunity.
/

If

the opportunity failed to materialize, the charter simply was not
12
used.
Chartering officials generally shared the optimism of the
period and felt that rapid growth would quickly justify their liberal
charter policy.^
TABLE lit
NUMBER OF PEOPLE PER BANK FOR 1909 AND 1921 BX STATE3,
Population per Bank
State

1909

1921

Michigan
Wisconsin
Minnesota
MONTANA
South Dakota
North Dakota

ks670
3,920
2,390
2,920
9h6
899

5,130
2,710
1,590
1,370
92.1
768

United States*5

3,950

3,520

aSources Curtis L. Mosher, The Causes of Banking Failure in
the Northwestern States (Minneapolis, 1930), 28.
, ^Excludes island possessions.
" '

)■

^®G.roth, "Montana Banking History," Li3°
11
Curtis Le Mosher, The Causes of Banking Failure in the North
western States (Minneapolis^ 1930), 8. Cited hereafter as Mosher,
Causes of Failure.

“IO
Groth, "Montana Banking History," Lii~U5<
-^Mosher, Causes of Failure, 6-7.
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| By failing to insist on proper banking standards* the Banking
Department in Montana and the Comptroller of the Currency indirectly
contributed to a weak banking system.^

Frequent attempts were made

to liberalize national bank requirements.

In 1900 the minimum capi

tal requirement for national banks was reduced, from. $50*000 to a
$25*000 minimum.

The restriction on the amount of national bank-notes

that could be issued was changed from. 90 percent to 100 percent of
the value of bonds deposited to secure their issue.

In 1906 the

restrictions on total loans to any one individual*, firm or corpora
tion by an individual bank were changed from 10 percent of capital to
10 percent of capital and surplus..15

These were only a few of the

changes made to liberalize banking requirements.

Since state require

ments generally were more liberal than national bank requirements* the
Comptroller of the Currency argued that national banks operated under
a competitive disadvantage.

His annual reports for the early 1920"s

asked that the two types of banks be placed on an equal, footing.
TABLE 15
NUMBER OF BANKS TO POPULATION FOR SELECTED STATES IN 1920a
State
Minnesota
MONTANA
North Dakota
South Dakota
New York
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts

No. of Banks

■Population

1*515
U31

2*387*000
5!i.9*OQO
614?.*000

898
69 !*

1*056
1 *51*6
U65

Average No.
People per Bank
1*600

637*000

1*300
700
900

10*385*000
8*720*000
3*852*000

5*700
8*300

9*800

'aSource!; Paul W. McCracken* The Northwest in Two Wars* Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis '(Minneapolis;* n.d.)* l6o
111
Bremer* Bank Failures* 110.
■^Anderson* Control of Banking* 316.

| State banking officials and the Comptroller of the Currency con
tributed to the collapse of the early 19209s by continually lowering
banking standards and by the granting of an excessive number of bank
charters „ The excessive number of banks in Montana during this period
was an important factor in the inability of the banking system to
withstand the crisis during the 1920=1926 period,,
Government supervision of banking was extended in 1913 by the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System,,

Its objectives included

the establishment of a flexible note supply based on self-liquidating
commercial paper and the establishment of a source of emergency credit
17
for banks in times of financial stress „

The System was not esta

blished to prevent bank failures although its functions contributed to
a strengthening of the banking system,.

The System could not assure

good bank management or make a bank's operations automatically success
ful,,18
At the time of its establishment3 central banking experience
was nonexistent and the role of the Federal Reserve System was not
clearly defined.

Early Federal Reserve officials were commercial

bankers and lacked a clear understanding of the functions of a central
banko 19

In addition,, the accepted theory of business cycles affected

Federal Reserve actions„ Federal Reserve officials viewed periods of
17
Bradford,, Banking9 UI460
1 Q

Charles Wallace Collins, Rural Banking Reform (New York,
1931)5 Ul-1*2 .
1 '*L
19
^Letter of Glement Van Nice to John Ho Tooles Dec. 85 1966.'
(Copy in the possession of Dr. K. Ross Toole,, Department of History5
University of Montana.) Cited hereafter as Letter of Clement Van Nice
to John H. Toole5 Dec. 8S 1966.

boom and rapid expansion as the inevitable result of excessive credit
expansion.
ary boom.

Depression was the inevitable result of such an inflation
If credit was restricted to its proper role of financing

the production and distribution of goods3 inflation and depression would
be prevented.

The use of credit for such speculative ventures as with

holding products from the market in anticipation of a price increase
was regarded as improper. Indeed,, Federal Reserve officials viewed the
post-war period of expansion as a period of credit misuse.

20

Because of this theory,, the Federal Reserve System viewed its
role as one of assisting in the "orderly liquidation" that would follow
the inflationary period.
economic recovery.

Liquidation was regarded as necessary for

The proper role of the Federal Reserve System was

a passive one that would facilitate the liquidation process.

Actions

to stimulate recovery were regarded as artificial and even as superflclaloI High rediscount rates were necessary to assist the liquida
tion of credit excesses accumulated during the preceding boom period
and to discourage nonessential credit expansion.

It was believed

that only in this way could a sound recovery be realized.

The in

fluence of these ideas on the actions of the Federal Reserve System
during the early 1 920 's is apparent when the events of this period
are examined. j
|During the First World War the government encouraged rapid
productive expansions Federal Reserve policy during this period
generally followed the needs of the government.

Bank credit expan

ded rapidly to encourage rapid industrial expansion and to finance
on

Clay J. Anderson5 A Half-Century of Federal Reserve Policy
makings 193it°1961»a Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Philadel
phia^ £1965/) c, 16 -3I4. passim. Cited hereafter as Anders on s Federal
Reserve Policymaking.

t
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large government expenditures„ Rediscount rates were set at artifi
cially low levels and preferential rates were allowed on government
By the spring of 1919 the Treasury Department had floated
21
loans totaling $21 billion at interest rates below the market levels
securitieso

Such an undertaking would have been impossible without the cooperation
of the Federal Reserve System,,

The extension of Federal Reserve credit

in the form of loanss rediscounts and bills purchased increased be
tween 1917 and 1918 by 1SU87 percent,,

During the same period Federal

22

Reserve notes increased lj.83 percent„

Between 1918 and 1919 <> the Federal Reserve Board continued
to follow the policy of the Treasury Department„ The System tried
to curb excessive credit expansion through appeals to member banks
for the elimination of speculative and nonessential loans, The de
mand for additional collateral for rediscounts was an attempt to
reduce member bank rediscounts by reducing their supply of eligible
23
paper.
Such policies generally were unsuccessful in restricting
the rapid credit e x p a n s i o n I n May 1919 the Victory Loan was
floated at U 3

percent.

It was not until this operation was com

plete that the Treasury Department felt secure enough to agree to
any credit restriction by the Federal Reserve System,

By this time

the rapid economic expansion and inflation were well advanced.
Concern began to develop over rapidly increasing prices as
inflationary pressures continued.

Complaints were heard on all sides

^Bradf©rd5 Banking j, 14*8.
22

U. S. Congress9 Agricultural Inquiry«, II9 37.

23
"Anderson. Federal Reserve Policymakings 21-22,
?)1
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about the high cost of living, ^On May 17, 1920, the United States
Senate adopted a resolution asking the Federal Reserve Board to re
port what actions had been taken to meet the inflationary threat.
Newspapers joined the clamor for price reductions.

This growing con

cern and the increasing;-,exhaustion of credit resources produced a rapid
change in the psychological attitude of the people.

With the beginning

of the price decline in 1920., optimism turned to timidity.
cancelled orders and bankers began to contract their loans.

Merchants
25

The

entire process had a snowballing effect. I
Free from the necessity to pattern actions by Treasury De
partment policy, the Federal Reserve System, began to slowly tighten
the supply of credit.

In December 1919 rediscount rates were raised

slightly and larger advances were made throughout the following year.
Several Federal Reserve banks had reached 7 percent by midyear.

Uni

form rates were adopted and the differential on government securities
was abolished.

Rates were based on loan maturity regardless of the

security pledged on the theory that member bank endorsement made all
rediscounts theoretically sound.

The elimination of preferential

rates on government securities led to widespread selling of these
26
securities as banks turned to investments with higher yields.
The
large influx of government bonds onto the market caused the price to
fall sharply.

J

| The problem of Federal Reserve credit policy was complicated
by the credit position of many banks.

In 1920 roughly one-5*third of

2^U. So Congress, .Agricultural Inquiry, II, §5.
2 6 ^

,Q
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the nation’s banks were overextended., one-third were moderately ex
tended and one-third were lending conservatively,,

The one-third

that was overextended generally had reached the point where further
borrowing would endanger their solvency.

An easing of credit policy

by the Federal Reserve System would encourage an expansion of loans.
If loans were expanded during a period of rapidly declining prices
the credit strain would become more pronounced and the possibility
of bank failures would increase.

A rediscount rate reduction of

sufficient magnitude to arrest the process of liquidation seemed
2? '
to be a real menace.
Because of this situation«, the Federal Re
serve System was reluctant to encourage an easy credit policy.

The

choice seemed to fee one of high rediscount rates with the resulting
hardships or lower rates and the possibility of a financial.crisis.
The first alternative was selected, j
\

ffiy September X9205 the general commodity price index fell
from a peak of 2?2 to 2ij.2 and the agricultural products price index
fell from 2.kh to 210 „ Strong sentiment developed that pointed to
the high Federal Reserve rediscount rate as responsible for the
sharp decline.

The Federal Reserve System was accused of pursuing

a conscious program of forced liquidation.
true.

This accusation was not

28

In the Ninth Federal Reserve District between 1920 and 19215
a decrease of

million in the loans and, discounts of member

2?U. S. Congress s Agricultural I n q u i r y IX<> 87-88.
^Anderson a Federal Reserve Policymakings 26.

banks was matched by a decrease of only $12 06 million in the total
amount borrowed from the Federal Reserve bank.

In addition,, the con=

tention that Federal Reserve credit was withheld from agricultural
areas was not true.

While the loans and discounts of member banks in

agricultural counties

29

were reduced by $19.1 million, the total bor=

rowing from the Federal Reserve bank in the same counties increased by
$18„3 millions

For the nation as a whole, loans and discounts of

member banks in agricultural counties were decreased by $36.5 million
while borrowing from Federal Reserve banks increased by $127.6 million.
The contrast in liquidation illustrated in Table 16 shows that the
most severe contraction took place--in the non-agricultural counties.
TABLE 16
PERCENT OF INCREASE OR DECREASE IN BORROWING FROM
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS BY MEMBER BANKS, 1920=1921
(Millions of Dollars)
Location
Ninth District s
Agricultural Counties
Semiagricultural Gounties
Nonagrieultural Counties
Total
United Statess
Agricultural Counties
Semiagrieu.ltural Counties
Nonagricultural Counties
Total

Loans and Discounts
of Member Banks
- U.8
- 6.1
12.0

-

- 8 .0

-

1.2
1.3

Borrowing From
Federal Res.
+102.2
- 7.It
=

1*6.9

- Ik .3

+
-

56.6
0.2

- 5 .6

- 28.5

- k .5

- 19.5

aS©urees U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry9 Hearing before
the Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 67thCong. , 1st Sess.,
(Washington, 1922), II, 103.
2^Counties where the value of agricultural production exceeds
80 percent of the value of total county production were classified as
agricultural.

Uo
As the price decline of 1920 progressed,, the loans of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis climbed steadily,,
they had reached an all-time higho

31

By October 1920*

The Minneapolis Bank found it

necessary to borrow from other Federal Reserve banks to meet the grow
ing credit needs of the Ninth District.
reserve was 39 =2 percent.

On January 1* 1921* its actual

Without the funds borrowed from other Fed-

eral Reserve banks* this ratio would have been 29.7 percent.

32

Between 1918 and 1920* farm mortgage loans in Montana in
creased from'7.6 percent of the total mortgage loans to 12.5 percent.
During the same period personal and collateral loans to farmers in
creased from 3 8 .9 6 percent- to h7°72 percent of the total.

These

averages for the nation as a whole were 1|.50 percent and l|.97 percent
respectively for farm mortgage loans and 11.17 percent and 13.29 percent respectively for personal and collateral loans to farmers. 33

Be

tween 1922 and 1925 the total decrease in the amount of agricultural
loans within the Ninth District was only 3.6 percent of the total or
*51
1.2 percent average each year.
Between February 1* 1921s and August 31* 1921* the loans of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis increased from $7.6 million
to $13.6 million in Mantana.

During 1921 the Helena Branch of the

Minneapolis Bank loaned funds to 176 banks that totaled $32.7 million
31
Mosher* Causes of Failure* 18.
12

^ "Banking and Financial Notes*" The Bankers Magazine* LII
(February* 1921)* 318.
■^U. S. Congress* Agricultural Inquiry* II* 97=98.
^Mosher* Causes of Failure. 18.

35 Table 17

in rediscounts and $25.2 million in collateral loans.

illustrates the decrease of these amounts in the following years.
TABLE 17
REDISCOUNTS AND LOANS TO MEMBER BANKS IN MONTANA
BY THE HELENA BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS BY YEARa
Year
1922
1923
19214
1925
1926

1966.

Nov.-'of Banks
:.Served __
165

13,777
9,21*1

132'
102
60

14,763

1,51*5
1 ,5 0 7

1*8
aSources

Rediscounts
No. ,
Amount
$20,965,000
ll*,183,000
5 ,6 2 2,0 00
1 ,551*,000
1 ,0 5 5,0 00

No.

Loansnu
Amount

539 $7,1*05,000
3 ,8 ll*,0 0 0
81* 1,851,000

260

30
238,000
63 1 ,053,000

Letter of Clement Van Nice to John H. Toole, Dec. 8 ,

The figures illustrated in Table 17 represent the new loans
made and do not measure the length of loan maturity.

A more meaning

ful measure of the amount of credit supplied to Montana banks on a
continuous basis is indicated by the average amount ©f daily borrow
ing by member banks from the Helena Branch.
daily borrowing during this period wass

The average amount of

$1 0 ,061*,000 in 1921 j ;

$7,511,000 in 19221 $1*,803,000 in 1923? $1,917,000 in 1921*.

Many

banks were almost continuously indebted to the Federal Reserve bank
throughout this period.

Without the credit supplied by the Federal

Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and the Twin City correspondent banks,
a considerably larger number of banks would have been unable to withstand the financial crisis.

36

■^Letter of Clement Van Nice to John H. Toole, Dec. 8 , 1966 .
See also Groth, "Montana Banking History," 6 l.
-^Letter of dement Van Nice to John H. Toole, Dec. 8 , 1966 .

1*2
An examination of the consolidated balance sheet for Montana
state and national commercial banks on June 30* 1921* shows that many
banks were overextended.

Total deposits were only $2 million more

than total loansj the ratio of loans to deposits was 98.6 percent.
Borrowing equaled 20 percent of deposits and about one-half of the
banks had total loans that exceeded the amount of their deposits,
In some cases this excess was by a large margin.

37

The following

condensed financial statement in Table 18 reveals this overextended
position and shows why the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis was
reluctant to encourage further credit extensions by lowering the
rediscount rate.

Rather than forcing a radical liquidation* the

Federal.Reserve.Bank of Minneapolis made it possible for many Mon
tana banks to continue carrying large amounts of overdue paper.
TABLE 18
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF CONDITION (CONSOLIDATED)a
1*20 MONTANA BANKS
(llf.3' NATIONAL - 27? STATE)
June 30* 1921
Assets
Loans
Investments
Cash
Other
Total

$1^ * 000*000

27* 000*000
29 *000*000

10* 000*000
$210*000*000

Liabilities
Deposits
$11*6*000*000
28* 000*000
Borrowings
Nat'1 Bank Notes
1**000*000
Capital Accounts
31*500*000
Other
5 0 0,0 00
Total
$210*000*000

Sources Paper presented by Clement Van Nice and Dick Heiber
before the joint meeting ©f the Board of Directors ©f the Minneapolis
and Helena offices ©f the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis on
Oct. 15* 1 966 .
37
Paper, presented by Clement Van Nice and Dick Heiber before
the joint meeting of the Board of Directors of the Minneapolis and
Helena offices of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis on Oct. 15*
1966 . (Copy in the possession of Dr.. K. Ross Toole* Department" of
History* University of Montana.)

During the early phases of the 1920-1926 banking crisis the
business cycle theoiy held by Federal Reserve officials supported a
passive policy.
........

modified.

<]Q

As the period progressed, these ideas were slowly
..

.•

-.

:.•■■■

In 1921 the severe criticism of Federal Reserve policy

resulted in a Congressional inquiry.

Hearings were held on the role

of the Federal Reserve System in the 1920 agricultural crisis.

Rather

than criticizing rediscount rate increases, the.commission stated
that action should have started earlier.

In their opinion, Treasury
39
Department policy should not have dictated Federal Reserve actions.

Once liquidation was under way the commission felt that Federal
Reserve policy should have been softened slightly to ease the dis
tress caused by the deflation.^

These findings influenced the

developing ideas about the proper role of the Federal Reserve System
in the economy.

Undoubtedly it provided officials with a strong

motive to explore the proper role of the System further.

1+1

It is doubtful whether lower rediscount rates would have pro
vided a solution to Montana's difficulties.

When banks are overex-

tended as they were in 1921, an easy credit policy is not the answer
to strengthening the position of the banking system.

In

Further loans

by the Federal Reserve would encourage banks to make further extensions
of credit.

It is clear that the Federal Reserve System did not

OQ
Charles 0. Hardy, Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve
System (Washington, D. C., 1932), 1+3«
3 % . S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, II, 12.
^°U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, II, 88.
^-Anderson, Federal Reserve Policymaking, 32.

function as a positive force to curb the deflation of the early 1920's
to the fullest extent possible.

However,, it is equally clear that it

was not used as a tool to force a rapid liquidation upon the banking
system.

In light of the economic theory of the time, Federal Reserve

actions were reasonable.

Certainly Federal.Reserve policy cannot be

assigned as a major factor in the Widespread wave of banking failures.

CHAPTER IV
THE INFLUENCE OF AGRICULTURAL FACTORS
Banking operations were greatly affected by the agricultural
conditions of the early 1920!s.

The wave of bank failures that oc

curred was in many respects a reflection of the widespread agricul
tural distress.

Montana was affected by world-wide as well as pe

culiar local agricultural conditions during this period.

As an

area of surplus agricultural production, the general prosperity of
the state was closely related to conditions in the.agricultural mar
kets.

Banks located in agricultural regions were heavily dependent

upon farm prosperity and generally lacked the financial strength of
the larger city banks.

As conditions in agriculture began to de

teriorate following the First World War, the situation was quickly
reflected in the banking system.

Therefore, agricultural conditions

during the early 1920's were an important part of the bank failure
pattern and as such require further examination.
Between 1900 and 1920 the general position of agriculture
in the economy continually improved in the United States.

Demand

for agricultural products increased more rapidly than production.
Between 1899 and 1909, agricultural production increased 10 percent
while population increased 21.5 percent.

Between 1909 and 1919,

agricultural production increased 10.5 percent while population in
creased lit.5 percent.'*'

This large increase of demand for agricultural

" V S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, lit.

U5

U6
products in relation to its production resulted in a period of agri
cultural prosperity8
The First World War created a period of great demand for
agricultural products. United States exports of crude foodstuffs
increased from $138 million in 19 lU to a total in 1920 of $918
milliono

2

However, agricultural production responded slowly to the

increased war demand.

It was not until after the armistice that

production increased significantly.

The agricultural production

index (1935“1939=100) shows the slow change in output that took
places

98 in 1915s 92 in 19l6j 90 in 1917 J 95 in 1918j 96 in 1919j

101 in 1920.3
The result of the increased demand and slowly expanding
agricultural supply was a sharp price increase.
to over $2.50 per bushel,

Wheat prices rose

The index of farm prices (1909=191^=100)

reached 200 in 1918 while the price index was 175 for necessary farm
purchases.^
power.

Farmers enjoyed a relative increase in their purchasing

As a result of this situation, the average net income of

farmers between 1915 and 1919 rose from $U,395 to $9 ,877.

This

farm prosperity was largely the result of high farm prices.
Q
George Soulf, Economic Forces in American History (n.p.,
1953), 37iu Cited hereafter as Soule, Economic Forces.
.

.

.

^Ibid.
^August C, Bolino, The Development of the American Economy;
(Columbus, Ohio, 1961 ), 339.
^Soule, Economic Forces, 375.

The nature of the increased agricultural production in the
Northwest states^ led to some post-war difficulties.

Expansion in

t

the production of food grains during the war left the area heavily
dependent upon the market condition for these grains.

In the years

following the end of the.war, export demand for wheat declined
sharply.

Although income in the United States was high during this

period, demand for food grains did not increase in the same propor
tion.

Increasing incomes were reflected in greater demand for such

food products as fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats and poul
try, and dairy products
to the same extent.

the demand for food grains did not expand

Declining grain exports were matched by the

inability of the domestic market to absorb the increased production
7
of food grains at prevailing prices.

The Northwest states, heavily

dependent upon wheat production, were unable to take advantage of
the post-war increases in income.

It was during this critical

period that wheat production in Montana, as illustrated by Table 19,
increased rapidly.
TABLE 19
TOTAL WHEAT THRASHED IN MONTANA
IN SELECTED YEARS, l899-192Ua
. Date
,'

1899
1909
1919
192U

.

Acres

Bushels

92,132
2^8,377
1,698,531
3,102,879

1,899,683
6,251s9bB
7,799j>61i7
iiU,058,012

cl
Sources U. S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the
United Statest 1930» Agriculture, II, Pt. 3, ll6.

Includes Montana, North and South Dakota, and Minnesota.
7
'McCracken, Northwest in Two Wars, 11-12.

1*8 .
Between 1900 and 1920 the population of Montana increased
rapidly.

New lands were opened during this period of agricultural

prosperity and settlers poured into the area.

Table 20 shows that

the number of farms in the state increased even more rapidly than
the population. . During the first two decades of the twentieth
century, agriculture expanded rapidly in Montana.
The increased agricultural demand of the First World War
led to a large increase in.the amount of land devoted to agricul
ture in Montana.

Between 1910 and 1920 the total area in farm

land increased from 13.5 to 35.1 million acres.. During the same
period the value of farm land and buildings increased from $251.6
Q
million to $776.8 million.
TABLE 20
CHANGES IN POPULATION AND NUMBER .OF FARMS
IN MONTANA, 1880-1930
Year

Population

1880
1890

39A$9
ll*2,92l*
21*3,329
376,053
5U8,889
536,332

1900
1910
1920

1930

Percent of
Increase
90.1
265.0
70.3
514.5
1*6.0
-2.3

No. of
farms
1,519
5,603
13,370
26,211*
57,677
1*6,901*

Percent of
Increase
78.5
268.9
138.6
96.1
1 2 0 .0

-18.7

cl
Sources Curtis L. Mosher, The Causes of Failure In the- North
western. States (Minneapolis, 1930), 2 8 .
— —
——

In the Northwest states the amount of cultivated land increased
16 2 /3 percent while production increased only 5 percent during the war.
Q

U. S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United
Statess 1930. Agriculture, II, Pt. 3 ,~"ll6 . Cited hereafter as Bureau
of the Census, Fifteenth Census; 1930, Agriculture.

h9

It is apparent from these figures that agricultural expansion had ad9
vanced'into marginal and submarginal lands.
Much of this new farm
land in Montana was suitable Only for "dry land" farming--a type of
farming that required a considerable amount of farming skill and ex
perience.

Farm failures were inevitable with the settlement of these

areas by people with little farming background and experience.

A

1923 study of areas of heavy farm failures in Montana revealed the
/

results of this indiscriminate settlement.

Of the farmers who failed,,

5l percent had no previous farming experience and 30 percent had no
10
capital.
This lack of farming experience was an important factor
in the widespread farm failures in Montana.
Peculiar local conditions added to the difficulties of Mon
tana farmers.

Drought conditions began during the summer of 1917

and crops during that year were generally poor.

Different areas

were affected in different ways during the following years.

How

ever,, drought conditions were generally a serious problem to farmers
throughout the state.
inches.

Rainfall in Shelby during 1916 was 10.26

During the following years it declined rapidlys 9*96 inches

in 1917| 8.88 inches in 19l8| 6.86 inches in 1919.

In 1919 Havre

received only 8.80 inches of rain and only 7.7lt inches fell in Glas
gow.11

The effect of the drought on wheat production was serious.

From an average of 20 bushels an acre between 1010 and 19l65
^Moshers Causes of Failure, 6.
10Ibid.9 0.
■^Toole9 Uncommon Land, 230.

50
production averages, in 191? fell to 2 1*/10 bushels per acre.
prevailing prices this meant a $50 million loss to Montana.

At

12

Table 21 illustrates the decline that took place in agricultural pro
ductivity.
TABLE 21
AVERAGE NUMBER OF BUSHEL YIELD PER ACRE IN MONTANA
FOR SELECTED CROPS5 1909 AND 1919a
Product

1909

1919

Wheat
Hay and Forage (tons)
Com
Oats
Barley
Rye
Flax Seed

21*.2
-.1.1*9
28.8
1*1<1*
27 .6
18.1*
11.9

I4.6
0.83
8.5
13.5
11.8
3.0
2.5

aSource; U. S. Bureau of the Census^ Fourteenth Census of
the United States; 1920. Agricultures II3 Pt. 3* 101*.
Conditions continued to place the farmer in a serious position.
Many farmers were unable to meet their payments on their bank loans
and many loans were renewed.

In 1918 farmers borrowed heavily to

plant crops2 the drought continued and drops were poor.

Drought con

ditions continued into 1919 and many streams dried up to their headsprings.
scarce.

13

Throughout these years harvests were small and feed was

To compound the difficultiesa winter began early in .1919 and

lasted until May of the following year.

Feed for livestock had to be

shipped in and by spring ranchers had expended $1*5 million to save
"^Toole., Uncommon Land., 235-36.
-^Annual Report of the Banking Department a 1921*j 11.

£

their herds.

As summer approached, livestock that had survived the

severe winter were faced with bare ranges.

At the same time the

price of beef began to decline sharply and stockmen found that their
livestock was worth less than their maintenance cost through the winter.
lU .
Many prosperous stockmen were ruined.
Poor agricultural conditions continued.
perienced its fourth successive crop failure.

In 1920 Montana exDeclining prices and

poor crops led to a strain on banks that had already stretched their
credit capacity to carry farmers through the past four years. 1*3

This

overextension of credit by Montana banks led to serious difficulties.
For five years Montana crops failed to yield any return above the
cost of production.

Banks continued-to grant renewals and extensions

since foreclosure was the only other alternative.'

Since land values

had declined sharply, such a course of action generally was not a
practical solution... Banks were soon in a difficult position as loans
increased and deposits decreased.

Banks borrowed to meet deposit

withdrawals and pledged assets as security for the loans.

As the

downward spiral continued, bank assets continued to depreciate in
value.

The situation resulted in a widespread wave of bank failures

as banks began to ’'fall by sheer exhaustion.11
The sharp price declines of 1920 added difficulties t© the
already serious agricultural situation.

When world purchasing power

litAnnual Report of the Banking Department, 192k s 11.
Mosher, Causes■of Failure, 10-11.

See also

52
began to decline following the First World War, the export demand for
American agricultural products began to fade*

As agricultural prices

declined, the purchasing power of the agricultural eQmmunity--nearly
lj.0 percent of the total— began to decline.

The impact of this de

cline resulted in a decrease of demand for industrial products and an
increase in unemployment.

17

Between 1919 and 1921 a decline from 215

to 12JU took place in the price index for farm products.

At the same

time the price index fell from 202 to 152 for items that farmers pur
chased.

As a result of these changes, farmers in 1921 could purchase

only three-quarters as much with their current income as they could
before the war.

Between 1919 and 1921 the gross farm income in the

United States declined from $17,710 million to $10,14.78 million.

The

relationship of farm income to farm expenses did not recover its
1 ft

1910-191U level until the Second World War.
The price declines that vitally affected Montana in 1920 were
closely related to world-wide conditions.

The sharp declines were

not' caused by overproduction or overmarketing in the United States.
However, the decline of export demand for agricultural products was
an important factor.

Since agricultural products generally are pro

duced in surplus quantities in the United States, a small change in
-export demand exerts a great influence on domestic prices. .Unless
excess production is absorbed by exports it tends to depress agricultural prices.

19

The price decline of 1920 was largely the result of

this situation.
17U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 17.
-^Soule, Economic Forces s 377.
^ U . S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 1,5.
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The extent of the price decline of 1920 was a major factor in
determining the farm prosperity of the early 1920's.

In 1921 the index

of selected farm product prices (1909“19lU=100) revealed the sharp
declines that had taken places

wheat, 78j beef cattle, 71| sheep, 6U|

20
wool, 6 3 j average of 31 selected agricultural products, 6 7 .

By 1921

the purchasing power of the farmer's dollar was 76 cents in terms of
1913 dollars.

21

This was the lowest point it had reached in thirty

years.22
The value of agricultural land is a useful index to measure
farm prosperity.

The value of farm land generally increased while

farm prices were high and future prospects were bright.
prospered,, savings were reinvested in additional
tional pattern followed by American farmers.

As farmers

land— the tradi

Between 1910 and 1920

the average value of farm land in the United States rose from $19.81
23
to $6 9 .3 8 per acre.
In the four Northwest states, farm land values
.
2
k
-increased between 1915 and 1920 by 75 percent.

Bankers shared the

optimism of the period and the rise in farm land value reflected the
overextension of bank credit.
Farm mortgage debt expanded rapidly.

This large increase

was the product of the First World War land boom.

Mortgage amounts

increased more rapidly than either the value of farm land and
20
U« S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 31.
21
Ibid., 28.
•22I M d ., 1 3 „
21

-'Boule, Economic Forces, 375.

^McCracken, Northwest in Two Wars, 3.
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buildings or farm.production.

The increase of farm mortgage debt

illustrated by Table 22 is striking.

In Montana the percentage of

owned farms mortgaged increased rapidly: 15.6 percent in 1890 j
li+.O percent in 1900j 21.1 percent in I9 IO3 61+.6 percent in 1920.

25

The average rate of interest paid on these farm mortgages was
7.6 percent.

This increased cost of farm operation created an

additional financial burden in the following years.

Payment of

interest on this inflated debt structure required a disproportionate
part of current farm income.

This decline in farm purchasing power

for goods and services further depressed business activity.
TABLE 22
TOTAL FARM MORTGAGE DEBT OF OWNERS OPERATING
THEIR OWN FARMS5 1910-1920a
Area

1910

1920 .

$7738663283

Minnesota
North Dakota
South Dakota
MONTANA
Total— Northwest States

1+8,81+1,58?
32,771,359
IO37I+I328O

$251+,1+75,222
108,281+,682
903082 ,31+6
777,91+9,679

$169,220,509

$530,791,929

Total.— United States$1,726,200,000

$1+,012,700,000

aSource: Curtis L. Mosher, The Causes of Banking Failure in
the Northwestern States (Minneapolis, 1930), 28.
"""
Commercial banks assumed an active role in the expansion of
the farm mortgage debt.

Banks became a center for farm land trans

actions and bankers became involved in profitable land speculations.
S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 206.

26Ibid.,208.
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As an active participant in speculative land transactions, the banker •'
2?
was not in a position to urge a conservative view of farm land values.
Farmers with first mortgages found it relatively easy to obtain funds
to expand operations by giving a second mortgage.

Bank officers often

encouraged land purchases through low down-payment requirements and
easy repayment.terms. .Unsecured notes often were accepted for the'
balance due on land purchases.

The subsequent criticism by bank ex

aminers generally forced the conversion of these notes into second
mortgages.

With the collapse of farm land values in 1920, banks

found themselves holding large amounts of worthless second mortgages
28
representing an equity in unsalable land.
Banks often held port
folios that were overburdened with slow and frozen earning assets.
The debt burden created during the years preceding 1920 had
a disastrous.?: effect on farmers after the sharp price declines.
Falling agricultural prices made it difficult for farmers to meet
payments on mortgage debts and to purchase necessary supplies.

Farm

debt had more than doubled during the 1910-1920 periods the price
declines of 1920 had the effect of again doubling this farm debt.

29

As a result, farm foreclosures as a percentage of the total number
of farms increased rapidly in the United States i .1+ percent during the
war; 1 .2 percent in 1922 ; 1 .5 percent in 1923 j 1 .7 percent in 192 lt.
The proportion of farm bankruptcies to the total bankruptcies in the
country rose from 7 to l 8:ipercent.

30

27
Mosher, Causes of Failure, 16.
28 Ibid., 16-17.
2^U. S. Congress, Agricultural Inquiry, I, 20.

■^Soule,. Economic Forces, 377.
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In Montana the tragedy was even more striking than the nation
wide experience.

The average value of farm land and buildings de

clined between 1920 and 1925 from $22.15 to $13.91 per acre.^

The

total value of farm land and buildings declined from $776 <,76 ? <>529 to
$ 1 * 5 5 8 8 7 in the state.

32

During a period of highly inflated farm

debt based on high land values, such, a decline inevitably affected the
banking operations of the area.
The combination of these agricultural factors was an important
part of the bank failure story in Montana during the early 1920’s.
Indeed, the Superintendent of Banking in Montana attributed Montana’s
financial crisis to three causes; "Deflation, Drouth and the High
Tastes of its people."

33

The first two factors refer to the agricul

tural situation during this period.

Rapidly falling farm prices and

farm income were faced by a highly inflated farm debt situation.
Local drought conditions and an economy that produced agricultural
goods that were insensitive to rising national income left Montana
in a difficult position.

Banks of the area were generally small

banks that lacked financial diversification.

Generally, they were

small rural institutions that were closely tied to the local farm
economy.

With the drastic agricultural crisis of the early 1920’s,

many banks were unable to withstand the resulting financial pres
sures.

The widespread wave of bank failures in Montana during the

1 9 20 's was in part a reflection of this agricultural distress.

3%. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Agriculture;
Montanas Counties and State Economic Areas (Washington, D. C., 1956), 2.
32Uo S. Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Censuss 1930, Agri
culture, 1 1 6 .
33Annual Report of the Banking Department, 1922., 13.

CHAPTER V
FINANCIAL STRENGTH AS A FACTOR IN BANK FAILURES
Changes of financial account balances during the 1920-1926
period were an important part of the bank failure pattern in Mon
tana.

An examination of these account balances reveals many of

the financial weaknesses that were an important factor in bank
failures.

Changes in balance sheet account balances may reveal

the success of bank management in meeting the unforeseen difficul
ties of this period.

Such changes in accounts provide a useful

picture of banking operations in Montana as banks struggled for
survival during the early 1 9 2 0 's.
The division of Montana banks into failing and non-failing
categories used in Chapter II can be utilized to examine some of
the differences that existed in the account balances of these two
groups.

For this purpose a comparative balance sheet has been

constructed in Table 23 that includes both failing and non-failing
banks.

Further detail is provided in Table 2k and Table 25 for

national and state banks in Montana.

A comparison of the percen

tage columns of these statements reveals the differences that
existed in 1920 between these two groups of banks.
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TABI£L23
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR FAILING AND NON-FAILING
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA IN 1920a

ASSETS
Loans* Discounts*
Overdrafts
Bonds, Investments*
Real Estate
Legal Reserve
Other Assets
Total

Failing
Amount
Percent
(millions) of Total

Non-Failing
Percent
Amount
of Total
(millions)

$65.1

75. h

$79.8

6lu7

9.6
3.9
7.7

1 1 .1

1 8 .8
1 6 .0

15.2
7.0
13.1

$86.3

1 0 0 .0

$123.3

1 0 0 .0

$29.5
25.5
19.3
$7U.3

3U.1
29.5
22 .U
86.0

$U9.3
39.8
16.9

Uo.o
3 2 .2
1 3 .7

$1 0 6 .0

85.9

$8.5

9.9

$10.1

8.2

3.5
$12.0

U.l
1 U .0

$17.3

5.9
lk.l

$86.3

1 0 0 .0

$123.3

100.0

li.5
9.0

8.7

LIABILITIES
Demand Deposits
Time Deposits
Other Liabilities
Total

CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Capital
Surplus and Undivided
Profit
Total
Total

7.2-

aCalcuiated from individual balance sheet statement of nation
al banks on Sept. 8, 1920 * included in the Annual Report of the Comp
troller' of the Currency. State bank statements are taken’on Nov. 15s
1920* from the Annual Report of the Banking Department in Montana.
Only banks in business on these dates are included.
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TABLE 2i*
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR FAILING AND NON-FAILING
COMMERCIAL STATE BANKS IN MONTANA3,
November 15* 1920

ASSETS

Failing
Percent
Amount
(thousands) of Total

Non-Failing
Percent
Amount
of Total
(thaii&ahds)

80.5

$3U0.7

68.8

5.1
5.5
.9
1.2
6.8
100.0

53.1*
53.5
9.6
l*.o
3l*»6
$1*95.8

10.8
10.8
1.9
.8
6.9
100.0

$38.9
13.8
197.6
171.5
.1*

7.9
2.8
39.9

1.8

1.7
31*.1
30.1
.5

$271.0

81*.8

$1*22.2

85.3

$35.9
8.9
3.6

11.2
2.8
1.2

9.6
3.3
1.8

Total

$1*8.1*

15.2

$1*7.5
16.7
9.1*.
$73.6

11*-.7

Total

$319.1*

100.0

$1*95.8

100.0

Loans, Discounts
Overdrafts
Bonds and Warrants
Legal Reserve
Due from Other Banks
Other Real Estate
Other Assets
Total

$257.3
1 6 .1*

17.6
12v 8
3.7
21.6
$319.1*

LIABILITIES
Bills Payable
Due to Banks
Demand Deposits
Time Deposits
Other Liabilities
Total

$58.9
5.1*
1 0 8 .8
9 6 .1

1 8 .1*

31*.6

.1

CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Capital
Surplus
Undivided Profits

aCaleulated from individual balance sheet statement of state
banks: on Nov. 15, 1920, taken from the Annual Report of the Banking
Department in Montana,, Only banks in business on that date are in
cluded.
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TABLE 25
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET FOR FAILING AND NON-FAILING
COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANKS IN MONTANA*
September 8, 1920
Failing
Amount
Percent
(thousands) of Total

ASSETS
Loans, Discounts,
Overdrafts
U. S. Government
Securities
Other Investments
and Real Estate
Legal Reserve with
Federal Reserve
Other Assets
Total

Non-Failing
Amount
Percent
(thousands)
of Total

$392.8

69.9

$602.2

61 . u

U2.U

7.5

83.5

8.5

5o.h

9.0

96.0

9.8

18.6
58.3

3.3

38.6

3.8

10.3

162.5

16.5

$562.5

100.0

$982.8

100.0

$193.5
162 .u
13U.9
$U90.8

3U.1*

1*0.2
30 .2
1 6 .1*

87.3

$39h.7
296.8
161.3
$852,8

$1*7.8

8.5

68.7

7.0

23.9
$71.7

1*.2
12.7

61.3
$130.0

6.2
13.2

$562.5

100.0

$982.8

100.0

LIABILITIES
Demand Deposits
Time Deposits
Other Liabilities
Total

28 .9
2J4.0

86.8

CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Capital
Surplus and Undivided
Profits
Total
Total
cl

Calculated from, individual balance sheet statements of na
tional banks on Sept. 8, 1920, included in the Annual Report of the
Comptroller of the Currency. Only banks in business on this date
are included.

6l
Generally, differences in account balances between the two
groups of banks were small.

Failing banks held a larger percentage

of their assets in the form of loans and discounts than non-failing
banks.

Investments accounted for a smaller percentage of the total

assets of failing banks.

Failing banks held a smaller percentage

of their liabilities as demand and time deposits than non-failing
banks.

The capital accounts were about the same for both groups.

These differences, although not striking or large, indicate a ten
dency for failing banks to be more heavily extended in loans than
non-failing banks; the source of these funds were less deposits
than other liabilities.
Important account balance changes took place throughout
the early 19201s. 'An examination of these changes in account bal
ances and of financial ratios during this period provides some in
sight into the financial strength of the banking system.

A compari

son of Montana banks with the averages for the United States as a
whole, provides a basis for evaluation of financial position.'*'

It

should be noted that as banks failed, they were eliminated from the
statistics of active banks upon which these comparisons are based.
Therefore, as the period progressed, the amounts increasingly tended
to represent the stronger banks that had survived the-crisis.

Rec

ognizing this fact, the account balances and ratios are still valu
able in determining the changes that occurred in the banking system
during this period.
■^A desirable comparison would be of failing and non-failing
banks in Montana throughout the early 1920's. However, statements
for state banks are published by the state Banking Department and
for national banks by the Comptroller of the Currency. Since state
ment' dates vary widely for these two groups, it was impractical to
construct a comparison on this basis.
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The amount of total resources of a commercial bank is an im
portant consideration in determining its financial strength.

Nor

mally., the amount of total resources of a healthy growing bank will
increase.

During periods of increasing total resources, the greatest

gains generally are made by non-failing banks.

Decreasing total re

sources are more common for failing banks as a group than for nonfailing commercial banks.

-An examination of Table 26 shows that

the total resources of Montana banks increased more slowly during
periods of increase and fell more rapidly during periods of decline
than the nation-wide bank averages.

Generally, this indicates that

Montana banks were in a less favorable financial condition.

However,

this factor cannot be considered in isolation of other account bal
ances | it is only one consideration.
„''iV O'.

.t:\oas of

. o>

\

.:

TABLE 26
CHANGES IN THE TOTAL RESOURCES OF STATE AND
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA
AND.,1THE 'UNITED STATES, 19l8-192?a

Year
1918

1919
1920
1921
1922

1923
1921*
1925
1926

1927

Montana
Amount
Percent of
(millions)
Change
$202.3
223.7
23U.9
2 1 0 .1

197.6
1 8 7 .6
11*7 .2
1 6 0 .6
1 6 3.2
1 7 0 .1*

+11
+ 5
-1 1
- 6

- 5
-22
+ 9,

+ 3
+ 3

United States
Amount
Percent of
Change
(millions)
$36,352
1*2 ,1*62
1*7,509
1*3,669
1*1*.,106
1*7,332
50,137
51*.,1*02
56,781
5^,973

+16
+12
- 8
+ 1

+
+
+
+
+

7
6

9
1*
1*

aSouree s Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statisticss
United States, 1896-1955» Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Washington, D. C., 1959), 38-1*5, 606-613 passim.
O
^Horace Secrist, National Bank Failures and Non-Failures3 An
Autopsy and Diagnosis (Bloomington, Indiana, 1938), 11. Cited hereafter
as.Secrist, National Bank Failures.
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The operations of a commercial hank are sustained by the earn
ings of its assets.

The most important of these are the loans and

discounts and the investments held by the bank for income purposes.
Therefore* changes in these account balances are of primary importance
to any assessment of financial strength.

Generally* a significant de

cline in the earning assets of a bank is a sign of financial weakness.
Failing banks tend to experience larger declines in their earning assets than non-failing banks.

3

An examination of Table 2? shows that

the earning assets of Montana banks increased slower during periods
of growth and declined faster during periods of decrease than the
nation-wide averages.

Generally* these figures indicate that Montana

banks were in a less favorable financial position than those of the
nation as a whole.
TABLE 27
CHANGES IN TOTAL EARNING ASSETS OF STATE AND
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA
AND THE UNITED STATES* 19l8-1927a

Year

Montana
United States
Amount
Percent of
Amount
Percent of
(millions)
Ghange
(mi.lll.ons)
Change

1918
1919
1920
1921

$153.8
167.8
189.5
170.6

1922

1 5 5 .8

1923
1921*
1925
1926
1927

11*6.6
105.6
•118.2
123.9
130.2

+9
+13
-10
- 9
- 6
-28
+12
+ 5
+5

$28*050
32*335
36*960
3k?7k6
3i1.5i1.OO
37 .>722
38*957
1*1*978
1*1*.*308
1*6*097

\ ‘
+15
+1.1*
- 6
- 1.
+10
+ 3
+ 8
+ 6
+ 1*

aSources Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics %
United States* l896-1955fl Board of Governors ofTEe Federal Reserve
System (Washington* D. C.* 1959)* 38-1*5* 606-613 passim.
^Secrist* National Bank Failures. 13.

6h
Deposits left with a bank are a major source of funds for bank
investment.

Since these funds are invested largely in customer loans

and other earning assets, a continued or sudden decline of this ac
count places the bank in a difficult financial position.
assets cannot be converted into cash immediately.

Most bank

Therefore, sudden

declines place the bank in an embarrassing position since quick liqui
dation of assets often involves a loss to the bank.

A more gradual

but continual decline in deposits results in a decrease of earning
assets and "starvation" of the bank.

It is apparent, therefore, that

failing banks tend more often to have declining deposit totals than
non-failing banks.

h

n

Table 28 indicates the changes that occurred in

total deposits during the early 1920's.

Generally, total deposits

of Montana banks increased at a slower rate and decreased more rapid
ly than the nation-wide averages.

These changes indicate that Mon-

tana banks were in a less favorable financial position.
Changes in the capital accounts do not always reflect a change
in the banks" financial strength.

The amount of capital funds needed

by a bank depends upon such factors as the volume of bank business,
size of deposits and other liabilities, the liquidity of the banks
earning assets, and other factors.

However, the surplus account is

of some importance as a reflection of bank earnings.

Profits not dis

tributed to owners are eventually added to this accountj operating
losses are eventually charged to the surplus account.

In this sense,

the changes that take place in the capital accounts are of some im
portance.

The adequacy of capital'account balances can only be

h
Secrist, National Bank Failures, 12.
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judged in relationship to other accounts.

Generally failing banks ex

perienced larger decreases in their capital account balances than nonfailing banks.

5

Table 29 indicates the changes that took place in

capital account balances during this period.
TABLE 28
CHANGES IN THE TOTAL DEPOSITS OF STATE AND
■ NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA
AND THE UNITED STATES3 19l8-1927a
Montana
United States
Percent of
Amount
Amount
Percent of
(millions)
Change
Change
(millions)

Year
1918
1919

$157.1+
181.3
172.2
11+6.2
138.2
H+1.3
119.1+
136.7
11+2.1
11+8.0

1920

1921
1922
1923
1921+
1925
1926
1927

+15
- 5
»15
- 6
+ 2
-1 6

+15
+ U
+ 1+

$28P708
33*251+
36a682
33*1+31
35*533
38s175
1+1*1+1+3
1+5*230
I+65951
I+8570 I+

+16

+10
- 9
+ 6
+ 7
+ 9
+ 9
+ 1+
+ 1+

aSsurces Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics;
United States» 1896-1955a Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Washington^ D. C. <, 1959)* 38-1+5* 6o6-6l3 passim.
A ratio used to determine the adequacy of capital funds is the
total capital funds to total deposits ratio.

Conventional thought

during the 1920*s maintained that a 10 percent minimum was necessary
for operating safety.

The conclusions of a study of failing national

banks during this period indicates that this general rule was false.
Generally5 ratios were lower for non-failing banks in the study than
for failing banks.

The 10 percent rule is illusoryj 5U percent of

the failing banks included in the study had ratios in excess of

^Secrist* National Bank Failures;, lit
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20 percent.^

This relationship is demonstrated in Table 30 by the

comparison of Montana and nation-wide bank averages.

Montana banks

failed at a higher rate than the average for the United States, yet
the Montana ratios of total capital accounts to deposits were higher
than the nation-wide averages.

The conclusion drawn from this rela

tionship is that the margin provided by owners in the form of capital
is never sufficient to cover the liabilities of the bank.

Its pur

pose is to establish customer confidence and if this confidence is
disturbed, the amount of capital is not sufficient to offset rapid
deposit withdrawals.

In this case it would take more than a high

ratio of total capital funds to total deposits to restore the bank's
financial position.
TABLE 29
CHANGES IN THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT BALANCES OF STATE AND
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA
AND THE UNITED STATES, 19l8-1927a

Year
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
192k
1925
1926
1927

Montana
Amount
Percent of
(millions)
Change
$28.7
30.5
32.5
31.k
29.7
27.k
19.5
18.8
1 8 .k
1 8 .2 -

+
+
-

6
6
3
5
8

-29

- k
- 2
- 1

United States
Amount
Percent of
Change
(millions)
$k,7k3
5,01k
5,599
5,936
6,Ok3
6,220
6,k21
6,637
7,022
7,392

■
4- 6
+12
+ 6
+ 2
+ 3
+ 3
+ 3
+ 6
+ 5

aSouree 2 Calculated from statistics in All.-Bank Statisticss
United States3 1896-19550 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. (Washington, D„ C., 1959), 38-k5, 606 -6x3 passim.
Secrist, National Bank Failures, 18-19.

67
TABLE 30
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF TOTAL CAPITAL FUNDS TO TOTAL
DEPOSITS FOR STATE AND NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS
IN MONTANA AND THE UNITED STATES3
19l8-1927a
i
Year

1918
1919
1920
.1921
1922
1923
1921*
1925
1926
1927

Montana

United States

.182

.165
.150
.152
.177
.170
.16 %
.iSii
.lli6
.llj.9
.151

.168
.188

.211*
.215
.19b
.163
.137
.129
.123

a
Sources Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics;
United States ■> 1896-^1955 a Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Washingtona D. C.5 1959)3 38-ii5.? 606-613 passim.
The same relationship exists between total capital funds and
total liabilities that prevailed in the comparison with total deposits.
Table 31 illustrates the relationship of these accounts as they existed during the early 1920's.
TABLE 31
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF,TOTAL CAPITAL FUNDS TO TOTAL
LIABILITIES FOR STATE AND NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANKS
IN MONTANA AND THE UNITED STATES,, 19l8-1927a
Year

Montana

United States

1918
.150
.165
1919
.157
.133
1920
.160
.133
1921
.157
.175
1922
.176
.158
.171
1923
.151
192U
.11*6
.153
1925
.132
.138
1926
.125
.liil
1927
.119
.11*3
aSource2 Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statistics
United States 3 1896-19559 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Washington> D. C . 5 1959) 5 38-1i55 606-613 passim.
•^Secristg National Bank Failuresj 18-19.

A comparison of total loans and discounts to total deposits
indicates the extent that funds are invested in the form of loans.
The total amount of loans is often difficult to decrease significant”
ly in a short period of time without injuring the customers of the
bank-and therefore the local economy.
liquid form of bank investment.

Loans are a relatively il-

It is because of this characteristic

that banks , heavily overextended in loans, experienced financial dif
ficulties during the periods of rapid deposit withdrawals.

Generally,

failing banks have a higher ratio of total loans and discounts to
total deposits than non-failing banks.

8

Table 32 shows that this

relationship was true in the comparison of Montana banks with the
nation-wide averages.

Indeed, in 1921 the ratio approached 100 percent

in Montana as loans failed to decline as rapidly as deposits.

This

situation began to change during the later years of the period as
bank failures declined in Montana.
The ratio of total .deposits to total resources -provides
another important indication of banking strength.

Successful, bank

ing operations depend to a.great extent on a bank's ability to at
tract deposits and to profitably invest these funds.

The higher

the proportion of deposits to total resources, the higher the
leverage factor and therefore the profitability to the bank owners.
Generally, failing banks have a relatively low ratio of total deposits
to total resources.^ This situation, as illustrated by Table 33<> was
true in Montana during the severe wave of .bank failures during the
early 1920 ss.
^Secrist, National Bank Failures. X$-l6 .
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TABLE 32
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF TOTAL LOANS AND DISCOUNTS
TO TOTAL DEPOSITS FOR STATE AND NATIONAL
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN MONTANA AND
THE UNITED STATES., 1918-192?a
Year

Montana

United States

1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
192h
1925
1926
1927

.827
.753
.9U3
.985
.961*
.81*7
.657
.576
.567
.566

.716
.686
.778
.789
.701*
.717
.682
.668
.683
.676

aSourees Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statisticss
United States9 1896-1955? Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Washington*, D. C.,, 1959)5 38“l*5j>, 6 06-613 passim.
These relationships indicate that Montana commercial banks
generally were financially weaker than the nation-wide bank averages.
This.'.is5 to some degree 3 an indication of management1s failure to
meet the financial crisis that faced them.

The account balances indi

cate the financial weaknesses that made it difficult for Montana banks
to withstand the severe crisis that faced them.
One' of the most severe problems that faced Montana bankers
during this period was the sharp decline of deposits and their inabil
ity to contract their assets in proportion to these increasing cash
demands.

This factor is pointed to by Federal Reserve officials as an

important cause of nation-wide bank failures during this period.^
Montana this situation was complicated by an inflow of deposit funds
from other states during the years preceding the 1920 crisis.
^Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1926, 13.

Farm

In
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mortgages carried high interest rates and enabled Montana banks to pay
relatively high interest rates on deposits.

With the sharp declines

in farm land values in 19205 Easterners became alarmed and began to
withdraw their funds from Montana banks.

The difficulty that this

11
action created was the conversion of earning assets quickly into cash.
In addition to this difficulty5 many banks had sold farm mortgages to
investors with a guarantee provision for the payment of the principal
and interest on the mortgage.

As payments were suspended during the

crisisP mortgage holders began to demand that banks fulfill their
guarantee obligations.

12

Table 3U shows the volume of funds between

1920 and 1921 that left Northwest banks.
TABLE 33
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF TOTAL DEPOSITS TO TOTAL
RESOURCES FOR STATE AMD NATIONAL COMMERCIAL
BANKS IN MONTANA AND THE UNITED STATES.
19l8-1927a
Montana

Year
1918

.777
.810
.732

1919
1920
1921
1922

.696

.699
.753

1923
192k
1925
1926
1927

.811
.8£l
.860

.868

United States
.789
.783
.772
.765
.805
.806

.826
.831
.826
.825

aSource s Calculated from statistics in All-Bank Statisticss
United Statesa 1 8 96 -1 9 55 3 Board of Governors' of the Federal Reserve
System (Washington P D. C »5 1959)$ 38-U5ji 606-613 passim.
"^Paul W. McCrackenp The Future of Northwest Bank Depositsp
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Minneapolisp 19U6) 5 3.

12

Mosher3 Causes of Failurea 8-11.
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TABLE 3U
FUNDS LEAVING NORTHWEST STATES, 1920-1921a
Amount
(millions)

State
MONTANA
Minnesota
North Dakota
South Dakota
Total

Percent of Total
Assets 6/30/20

$ 32
150
57

lL
12
22
20
15

66

$305

aSource; Paul W, McCracken, The Northwest In Two Wars, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Minneapolis, n. d.), 7.
!
As deposits declined, loss of confidence by bank,depositors be
came a factor.

The failure of a hank often frightened depositors of

other banks into withdrawing their funds.

This loss of confidence was

indicated by a decline of $30 million in the deposits of Montana banks
during a period when a net decrease of only two banks took place. . The
Assistant.Federal Reserve Agent of the Minneapolis Bank insisted that
enough money had been withdrawn and "hidden out" to restore the de
clining deposits of all of Montana's agricultural banks.^
The situation became a vicious circle.

As business activity

declined, bank deposits were withdrawn to pay bills and purchase
necessary items.

With the decline of deposits, banks were forced to

contract loans which further depressed business activity.

In addition

to liquidating their loans, banks were forced to borrow from corres
pondent banks and the Federal Reserve bank to meet the financial de
mands.

The entire situation was one of overextended banks generally

unable to meet the financial crisis.

The financial weakness of

■^Groth,. "Montana Banking History," L5.
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Montana banks during this period was certainly an important factor in
the failure of the banking system to meet the conditions that faced
it.

The widespread wave of bank failures reflected this financial

condition.

CHAPTER VI
SIZE AS A FACTOR IN BANK FAILURES
The size of the commercial bank was an important factor in its
ability to withstand the financial pressures of the 1920-1926 period.
Although increased size did not always indicate increased financial
strength., the larger banks generally enjoyed a greater degree of finan
cial stability.
larger banks.

Generally, small banks failed more often than the
This relationship was true whether the size of the bank

was measured by capitalization, amount of total resources, or the
amount of the bank’s total deposits.'*'

This relations,hip was true on

both the nation-wide level and in Montana.

Of the nation-wide bank

failures in 192U and 192$, I4.O percent of the banks had capital of less
than $2$,000 and 70 percent had less than $$0,000 in capital.

2

In

1926 the average capital account balance of ill failing banks in the

United States was $3$,000 and $288,000 in total deposits.

At the

same time the nation-wide averages for all banks were $1 1 6,0 00 in capital and $1,900,000 in deposits.

For the nation as a whole, failing

banks during the early 1 9 2 0 ’s were generally small institutions.
In Montana, the same relationship between size and failure
rate was true.

Banks with capitalization of less than $30,000 ac-

counted for 73*9 percent of the failing banks and $8 . 8 percent of the
non-failing banks examined.

Banks with total resources of less than

~*~Supra, Tables 6 , 1, 8 .
2

Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 192$, 32.

3

Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 19269 12.

^

$500*000 accounted for 83.2 percent of the failing and 68*7 percent
of the non-failing group.

Banks with total deposits of less than

$350*000 included 8U.1 percent of the failing and 70.9 percent of
the non-failing banks.

These percentages reveal the small size of

failing banks during this period in Montana.
The relationship of bank size to bank failure rate was recog
nized clearly by contemporary authorities on banking.

The role of

government supervision in the problem of bank failures during this
period was discussed in considerable detail.

The nation-wide epi

demic of bank failures was confined largely to small banks in small
towns.

Generally* these areas were agricultural.

Government policy

in the chartering of banks was responsible* in part* for the creation
u
of the large number of small banks.
The divided nature of govern
mental bank supervision led to governmental competition in the grant
ing of bank charters and the subsequent regulation of banking opera
tions.

The result of this situation was a highly competitave banking

system largely composed of numerous small unit banks.

These banks

fiercely competed for the available business and found it difficult*
as a result of this competition* to pursue conservative banking
practices. .During the years following the First World War* banks
generally prospered in spite of management policies.

The inexperi

enced bank management that existed was in part the product of this
small unit banking system.

Individuals who knew little about financial

u
See Chapter III for a discussion of the role of governmental
charter policy and its relationship to bank failures during this period.

75
operations or general economic trends were permitted to establish banks
because of their personal integrity and possession of the necessary
amount for minimum capital requirements.
cient to provide sound bank management.

Such a basis was not suffi
The amount of business avail

able to the small rural bank precluded the employment of experienced
bank managers.

One author points to this difficulty by stating that

''no community can possibly provide adequate resources, competent offi
cers, and experienced directors for one bank to every 750 of its in
habitants as in North Dakota, or to 1,U00 as in I o w a . I n Montana
the ratio in 1921 was 1,370 inhabitants to each bank.

7

Other more general economic forces were at work to decrease
the importance of the small rural bank.

Advances in transportation

and communication facilities increasingly
ence into rural areas.
business.

e x te n d e d

the urban influ

This invasion meant a decline of rural bank

Large city-centers were often within reach of rural areas.

For various reasons, residents in rural areas often found it advan
tageous to utilize the facilities of large city banks rather than
small local institutions.

In addition, other business enterprises

invaded rural areas and branches of city' firms became common in the
small communities.

Receipts from these branches were sent to home

offices where they were deposited in large city banks. These factors
alone were enough to make serious inroads into rural banking busi
ness.

In addition to these factors, city banks enjoyed a larger
^Anderson, Control of Banking„ 315.
^Willit, Banking, 126.
'

7

iin — ~I ii ’ —

'Supra, Table 1.
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degree of financial flexibility and often could meet credit demands
that local banks, because of their limited resources, were unable to
satisfy.

These factors combined to decrease the importance of the

small rural bank.
The geographical distribution of bank failures in Montana em
phasized their rural agricultural nature.

The area in Montana east of

the Continental Divide experienced the failure of 56.2* percent of its
banks during the 1920-1926 periodj in the area west of the Divide,
38.5 percent of the banks failed.

Although the entire state economy

was largely agricultural,, the eastern portion was more heavily depen
dent upon agricultural production.

In addition to this factor, the

size of community where bank failures occurred supports the contention
that the wave of bank failures was primarily a small-bank— small town
phenomena.

In the United States, 37 percent of the bank failures were

located in towns of less than 500 inhabitants,. 78 percent in towns of
less than 2,500, and 96 percent in cities of less than 2 5 ,0 0 0 population.

8

In Montana, 57»9 percent of the failing banks were located

—- in communities of less than 500 population.

9

In addition to being relatively small rural banks serving
sparcely populated agricultural areas, failing banks in Montana were
relatively new institutions.

Many of the banks that failed had existed

only a short time prior to the banking crisis of the early 1920‘s.
Only 3 percent of the failing banks and 9 percent of the non-failing
banks were in business prior to 1900 in Montana.

Of these failing
\
\

8
'
Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board, 1925, 32^
?Supra, Table 10.

banks5 79 percent were incorporated during the 193,0-1920 periodj
68 percent of the non-failing bank group were incorporated during
the same period.

Lacking operating experience during periods

of economic stress, Montana banks faced grave difficulties during
the severe conditions of the early 1920's.
The critical problem that faced the small bank was essen
tially its inability to achieve financial diversification of its
earning assets.

Generally, the small size of rural banks confined

its operations to a small locality and a limited number of enter
prises and industries.

Therefore, small banks lacked the ability

and resources to adequately diversify their financial holdings and
thereby to protect against economic fluctuations.

This spreading

of risk was an accepted method of protecting against declines in
different economic sectors and industries.

Since the small rural

banks in Montana were closely related to their local economy, their
investments and loans were heavily dependent on local conditions.
Little financial diversification was possible.

This investment

policy was profitable while the value of rural agricultural land
was increasing and farm mortgages were yielding high returns.

With

the price declines of 1920 and the serious conditions caused by the
drought, the basis of bank prosperity was undermined.
financial diversification was fatal.

The lack of

Indeed, Mr. J. W. Pole, the

Comptroller of the Currency, pointed to the lack of diversification
as the primary and fundamental cause of the difficulties of country
banks during this period.

11

^ Supra, Table 11.
1 *1

Bradford, Banking, 1|.31“32.
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With the widespread wave of bank failures in the 1920's, pro
posals were advanced to correct the inherent weaknesses of the banking
system.

The basic weakness of the small unit banking system as it

developed in the United States was well recognized prior to the 1920
crisis.

With the widespread bank failures of this period, the need

for corrective action became even more apparent.

Unit banking propon

ents staunchly defended the system as the best system to fulfill the
local credit needs of an area.

The unit banker was a local man who

knew the individual character of inhabitants and the local credit
needs of his community.

There was a strong resistance on this basis

to outside interference in local affairs.
The proponents of branch and group banking pointed to itsgil
advantages as an answer to the small rural bank problems.

Branch or

group banking allowed the diversification of loans and investments
with a resulting decrease in the credit risk.

In addition, since loan

demand varied, the branch banking system could easily transfer funds
from area to area resulting in better utilization of available capital.
This process would result in more uniform interest rates between dif
ferent areas.

In addition, the extension of credit by a branch system

could be undertaken safely with a smaller reserve than would be neces
sary for a unit„system.

The entire system would provide for a more

efficient utilization of available capital as well as allowing the
12
employment of more highly trained personnel.
It was pointed out that
the operation of small unit banks resulted in high operating costs be
cause of the high overhead expenses in relation to the small volume of

1?
Bradford, Banking, Ul3»
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business.

This problem would be solved by a branch banking system.

13

Against these advantages3 unit bank proponents argued that branch
bankers lacked the intimate knowledge of local affairs and individuals
that was essential to proper credit distribution.

It was assumed that

local banks were able to judge better the credit needs of the local
community.
The encouragement of group and branch banking in many respects
seemed to be the answer to the small bank dilemma.

Branch or group

banks could provide the services needed by rural areas without loss
of diversification of assets and financial strength.

The proposal

was an attempt to overcome the disadvantages presented by the small
size of rural banks.

In many respects it provided a reasonable solu

tion to a serious rural banking problem; the small size of banking
institutions.

As such it represented a notable step toward providing

rural areas with the banking stability available to city residents
in the same general area.

13
Anderson* Control of Banking, 315

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Failing banks in Montana during the 1920-1926 period had sev
eral distinct characteristics.

Generally, state banks failed more

often than national banks and the same relationship existed between
state non-member and Federal Reserve member banks.

Failing banks

were usually small institutions whether measured by capital, total
deposits, or total resources.

Failures occurred more often in the

area east of the Continental Divide than in the western portion of
the state.
ties.

Generally, failing banks were located in small communi

In addition, failing banks were relatively new institutions

with nearly one-half of the total number
years or less.
The role of governmental actions in the bank failures of this
period is of considerable importance.

Governmental authorities con

tributed to a weakening of the banking system through the granting
of an excessive number of bank charters and the competitive lowering
of banking requirements.

Indeed, the overbanked condition of Montana

was an important factor in the bank failures of this period.

Coirpeti-

tion between governmental authorities made officials reluctant to
strictly enforce or strengthen banking requirements.

In this sense,

the actions of the Banking Department in Montana and the Comptroller
of the Currency were partially responsible for the bank failures in^
Montana during the early 1920's.
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The role of the Federal Reserve System in the bank failures
of this period received a considerable amount of attention.

Redis-

count rate policy was sharply criticized as a conscious effort by
the Federal Reserve System to force a rapid liquidation of banking
credit.'*" This accusation was .not true.

In 1920 the Federal Reserve

System initiated a policy of restricting credit in an effort to re
lieve inflationary pressures.

This policy was long overdue.

Since

open-market operations were not generally used as a tool for credit
control until a later date, this policy relied upon an increase in
the rediscount rate.

The effectiveness of this tool was limited

since it left the initiative with the member banks.

The elimination

of the preferential rediscount rate on government securities was a
necessary part of this restrictive credit policy.

Banks tended to

rediscount securities that enjoyed the lowest rediscount rate? in
practice these rates became the effective rates.
restricted, this difference had to be eliminated.

If credit was to be
The sharp decline

in the price of these securities was an unfortunate result of this
change.

However, the policy was necessary and certainly indicated

no attempt by the Federal Reserve to force down the price of government securities.
In Montana, the Federal Reserve System followed a realistic
policy.

Banks were generally in a difficult financial position and

many were greatly overextended.

The Alarming financial condition

1
Joseph Kinsey Howard, Montana; High, Wide, and Handsome
(New Haven, 19U3)* 21Q-23U passim. Cited hereafter as Howard,
Montana.
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of Montana banks

2 made the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis reluc

tant to encourage further credit expansion by lowering the rediscount
rates.

Indeed, it seems doubtful that lower rediscount rates would

have provided a solution to the difficulties.

When banks are heavily

overextended as they were in Montana in 1921, an easy credit policy
is not the answer to a strengthening of the banking system.

The Fed

eral Reserve System could not prevent bank failures that were the re
sult of unwise bank policy.

Government supervision could not conden

sate for poor bank management.
The objectives of the Federal Reserve System did not include
the support of existing price levels.

The charge that the Federal
3
Reserve System attempted to force down agricultural prices was with
out merit.

Agricultural prices were determined largely by world-wide

conditions during this period.

The agricultural price declines of

the early 1920’s had no significant relationship to Federal Reserve
policies in the Ninth District.
The role of the Federal Reserve System in the control of credit
had not fully crystallized by the early 1920's.
new organization.

It was a relatively

While it is evident that the Federal Reserve Sys

tem could have acted more vigorously to curb the deflationary spiral,
it is equally clear that it did not pursue a policy of forcing a radi
cal liquidation upon the banking system.

Indeed, its credit extensions

allowed many banks to continue to carry large amounts of overdue paper.
2

Supra, Table 18.

3
Howard, Montana, 212. The author charges that the Federal
Reserve felt that agricultural products were inflated in value and
decided to pursue a policy of deflating farm prices.
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Within the framework of economic theory accepted by Federal Reserve
officials, the policies of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
- were reasonable.

Certainly, Federal Reserve policy cannot be regarded

as a major cause of bank failures in Montana during this period.
c -• -

The agricultural conditions of the early 1920!s were another
important factor in Montana bank failures.

Generally, Montana banks

were closely related to the rural farm economy.

Adverse climatic:.'

conditions and rapidly falling farm prices and income were faced by
a highly Inflated farm debt.

The local drought conditions and the' ’

production of agricultural products that were heavily dependent upon
export demand left Montana in a difficult position.

With the agri

cultural crisis, ,many banks were unable to withstand the financial
strain.

Certainly, the widespread wave of bank failures in Montana

during the early 1920 !s was in part a reflection of this agricultural
distress.
The financial strength of many banks allowed them to with
stand the economic crisis of the early 19201s.

Not all banks were

overextended and those that were successful in maintaining depositor
confidence and earnings were often able to survive.

Generally, the

balance sheet accounts of Montana banks in 1920 revealed a relative
ly weak financial condition.

Financial ratios and account balances

of Montana banks, when compared with nation-wide averages, partially
explain the higher failure rate.

In each comparison made, Montana

banks reflected a weaker financial condition.

This financial posi

tion was an important factor in the ability of banks to withstand
the strains of the period.

8U
The size of a banking institution was often related to its fi
nancial strength.

Generally, small banks lacked the ability to proper

ly diversify their earning assets.
upon the local economy.

This left them heavily,'dependent

When local economic conditions deteriorated

as they did in Montana following the First World War, banks were often
unable to withstand the strain.

As a result many of the banks in

these.areas failed.
Numerous causes existed for the bank failures in Montana during
the early 1920*s.

Governmental policy, agricultural factors, financial

strength and bank size were all important parts of the bank failure
pattern.

It was a combination of these factors that produced the tragic

bank failures of this period.

The lessons taught by these events were

significant in the years that followed.

A new banking code was passed

in Montana in the late 19201s that strengthened the state banking sys
tem.

In addition, the role of the Federal Reserve System was further

crystallized.

In these and many other ways, the tragic failures fo

cused attention on the weakness of the existing banking system.

The

changes and improvements made as a result of these experiences pro
duced a stronger banking system.

Certainly, the bank failures of

this period left their imprint upon the future.
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